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FOREWORD
U.S. national security is a subject that has been under
intense scrutiny since the end of the Cold War. What constitutes
such security for the United States as this country approaches
the new century? Are the ends, ways, and means of our national
security and national military strategies sufficient to provide
for the nation's future? And above all, as this country
celebrates the 50th anniversary of the National Security Act of
1947, are the institutions that resulted from that act still
sufficient for the post-Cold War era?
With these questions in mind, the Strategic Studies
Institute and Dickinson College's Clarke Center co-sponsored the
series of lectures on American national security after the Cold
War which are contained in this volume. The lectures take four
different, yet complementary, perspectives. Professor Ronald
Steel reminds us of the intellectual revolution embodied in the
act that moved America from the concept of "defense" to one of
"national security" and relates this concept to our attempts to
define post-Cold War national security interests. Dr. Lawrence
Korb reviews the evolution in our national security establishment
since the 1947 act. Dr. Morton Halperin's focus is the continuing
tension between secrecy in the name of national security and the
openness required in a democratic society, with a commentary on
continuing threats to civil liberties. In the concluding essay,
Ambassador Robert Ellsworth surveys the key strategic challenges
facing the United States as we enter the 21st century.
To set the context, Dr. David Jablonsky outlines the
transformations in national security paradigms that the United
States undertook a half-century ago, and that we wrestle with
today. The contributions of these expert scholars and
practitioners in the field of national security bear directly on
the issues which will shape the nation's 21st century destiny.
RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
David Jablonsky
THE STATE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE
The summer of 1997 marks the 50th anniversary of the
National Security Act, the legislation that established the
primary institutional basis for the American national security
state in the Cold War. The fundamental framework of that state
still exists almost a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Should it continue as the United States approaches the
millennium? If not, why not, and how should it be altered? In
order to begin to respond to these questions, the U.S. Army War
College and Dickinson College sponsored a series of lectures
focused on the concept of U.S. national security beyond the Cold
War. Four eminent scholars and practitioners concerned with U.S.
national security issues participated: Dr. Morton Halperin,
Professor Ronald Steel, Ambassador Robert Ellsworth, and Dr.
Lawrence Korb. Their lectures are contained in this volume.
The purpose of this introductory essay is to set the stage
for these presentations. Two themes dominate. The first involves
the proper mix of change and continuity, always a key concern in
a transitional era. This theme is examined against the backdrop
of three interconnected currents in American history: U.S. core
national interests, the concept of U.S. national security
envisioned as serving those interests, and the U.S. grand
strategy designed to support the concept of national security.
The second theme is concerned with the form and function of
government--or more specifically, how well throughout American
history the form of U.S. government has functioned in order to
meet the requirements of the U.S. grand strategy designed to
further U.S. national security interests. Together, these themes
comprise a major part of the broad strategic landscape used by
the four lecturers in this volume to examine national security
strategy beyond the Cold War.
PRE-COLD WAR
Change and Continuity.

National Interests and the Concept of National Security.
Lord Palmerston described core national interests in 1848 as the
"eternal" and ultimate justification for national policy.1 For
the United States, these interests can be divided into three
categories: physical security, economic prosperity, and promotion
of values.2 Physical security is defined as the protection
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against attack on the territory and people of a nation-state in
order to ensure survival with fundamental values and institutions
intact. It is the core interest most often associated with the
concept of national security. James Madison, for instance,
referred in The Federalist to "security against foreign danger"
as the primary reason for shifting power to the central
government from the member states.3 It was not until the 1940s
that the term "national security" came into full usage in U.S.
political discourse.4 But long before that, the concept of U.S.
national security had come to address not just the fulfillment of
physical security, but the other two core interests concerning
economic prosperity and promotion of values as well.
In the course of that development throughout American
history, there was a concomitant evolution in the concept of
national security that embodied both change and continuity. From
the very beginning of the Republic, the national security of the
United States was perceived as having both a foreign and domestic
component. Until the 1870s, both U.S. components tended to merge,
with national security primarily tied to both the safety of
national borders and the preservation of the federal union. The
1823 Monroe Doctrine appeared to stretch the American concept of
national security to the Western Hemisphere, but there was no
real substance to this doctrine. Beginning in the 1880s, however,
and lasting to the end of the 1930s, U.S. presidents returned to
the Monroe Doctrine and, by identifying U.S. security with that
of other hemispheric nations, caused the concept to enlarge. That
this identification could have an even broader context when
coupled with values going back as far as Jefferson's concept of
an "empire for liberty," was demonstrated in World War I by
Woodrow Wilson, who, like Monroe, perceived linkage between U.S.
security interests and those of other states attempting to be
free and independent. This tendency was solidified at the
beginning of World War II when Franklin Roosevelt identified
Great Britain in 1941 as the front line of U.S. security.5 While
fighting that war and making preparations for the peace, U.S.
leaders continued to expand the concept of national security and
used its terminology for the first time to explain America's
relationship to the world.
Throughout this same period, the perception by U.S. leaders
of the domestic component of national security continued to
evolve and bring a renewed focus on economic prosperity. By the
end of the 19th century, the full impact of the industrial
revolution combined with cheap migrant labor from Europe and a
series of depressions led to increased worker unrest. As a
consequence, presidential focus on national security in the new
century began to identify the possibility of domestic class
conflict as the major source of insecurity. One result was reform
by Theodore Roosevelt who, like Washington, believed "the general
welfare" was an active component of "the common defense."6
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This domestic preoccupation emerged again after World War I
and directly affected the foreign component of U.S. national
security. A major cause involved post-war social problems
concerning relationships between city and town and foreign- and
native-born. These problems increased national longings for a
homogenous America, reflected at home in a xenophobia marked by
the growth of the Ku Klux Klan and the passage of the National
Origins Act of 1924, and abroad by economic nationalism and
political isolation. The result in the return to "normalcy" of
the Harding and Coolidge administrations was the primacy of
domestic politics in national security: the idea that external
security was a by-product of American domestic economic
prosperity, not something that required domestic reinforcement.
All these tendencies converged in the Great Depression, perceived
as the ultimate threat to U.S. national security interests,
whether in the linkage of the economic downturn to domestic
unrest or to the potential destruction of the primary
institutions and values of a democratic, capitalistic America.
Ultimately, it would take an expanded foreign component of the
U.S. national security concept in reaction to World War II to
meet this threat.7

Grand Strategy. Prior to the Cold War, the strategies that
served the three core U.S. interests ranged from the global to
the insular, depending on the relationship between the foreign
and domestic components of U.S. national security. The drive for
physical security in a global sense was directly tied to the
expanding identification of U.S. interests with those of other
states, which in turn led to the concepts of both balance of
power and, to a lesser extent, collective security. Balance of
power was considered at times in U.S. history to be immoral and
unstable. And yet both Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt
considered the concept a vital enough matter to lead America into
two World Wars, primarily oriented on a view of national security
that entailed preventing the emergence of a single Eurasian
hegemon with a capability to wage war on the continental United
States. In a similar manner, Wilson's concept of collective
security in one sense was nothing more than an attempt to meet
the expanded notion of U.S. national security by regulating the
global balance with a community of power.8
The other extreme concerning national physical security was
isolationism, which simply meant a refusal to make commitments in
advance that might detract from American freedom of action. This
strategic approach was popular throughout much of U.S. history
because it worked. It was a realistic strategy when there were
few foreign threats and the nation was focused on economic growth
and continental expansion. The problem was that in the modern age
the preoccupation with the domestic component of national
security sustained the dangerous illusion that isolationism was
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still viable. "What gave isolationism a bad name was not that it
failed to provide security to the country for over a century,"
Terry Deibel has pointed out, "but that Americans failed to
abandon it when the conditions required for its success
disappeared at the beginning of the twentieth century."9
The dichotomy between the global and inward strategies was
also evident in the search for American economic prosperity. The
global focus was inherent in the underlying philosophical belief
in free trade and economic opportunities throughout most of
American history. In the 19th century, for example, the U.S. Open
Door Policy in the Far East reflected such a belief. This concern
with equality of economic opportunity also spilled over into the
expanding concept of U.S. national security. Thus, while balance
of power remained an underlying cause of American involvement in
conflicts with European powers, the wars of 1812 and 1917 also
involved maintaining the U.S. right as a neutral to trade with
any and all belligerents in the conflicts. On the other hand,
high tariffs and protectionism represented the historical inwardlooking strategies focused on a constricted domestic-oriented
concept of national security. These strategies generally provided
continuity from the Civil War until discredited by the Great
Depression, when free trade once again became orthodox American
policy.10
In a similar manner, for much of its history the United
States promoted its national values by example, the oldest form
of the "city upon a hill" projection. The change from this
inward-oriented "great exemplar" strategy began with the
expansion of the U.S. concept of national security. This was
particularly evident when that expansion involved the United
States in foreign wars, and it became apparent that idealism was
a necessary ingredient if a broader concept of national security
were to sustain public support. Whether it was Wilson in 1917
citing the need to make the world safe for democracy or FDR in
1941 adding reformist contributions to the Atlantic Charter, the
ideological promotion of national values provided a needed
counterbalance to the geopolitical focus on balance of power in
terms of rationale for the use of force to support U.S. national
security.11
Form and Function.
For most of U.S. history, the form of the American
government has been in keeping with the functions required by the
changing concepts of national security and the strategies
designed to meet those concepts. The result was normally a weak
central government, Cincinnatian in form, expanding in wartime
and contracting after every conflict. This government was served
by a small volunteer military dependent on the draft only as an

4

outgrowth of war--and even then not a welcome one as the New York
City riots demonstrated when conscription was introduced halfway
through the Civil War. It was also a government that normally
used private industry only in emergencies, depending instead on
its own arsenals and shipyards to meet the peacetime requirements
of the military. But as World War I approached, the demands of a
growing military exceeded the capacity of federal facilities to
meet them. The outcome was more continuous peacetime cooperation
between the military and private industry, which continued to
increase in the war. After that conflict, however, there were
allegations that the cooperation had resulted in widespread
profiteering for the "merchants of death" who had even instigated
the war to gain those profits. As a consequence, the interwar
years were marked by public hostility toward private arms makers
which, combined with low military budgets and congressional
willingness to follow the public will, limited government
connections with private industry and caused most research and
procurement to be reconcentrated in federal facilities.12
This limited centralization of executive function was the
exception in the decade after World War I in which the national
government was primarily concerned with handling mail, regulating
immigration, collecting tariffs, and enforcing Prohibition. "If
the Federal Government should go out of existence," Calvin
Coolidge commented, "the common run of people would not detect
the difference in the affairs of their daily life for a
considerable length of time."13 Only after the onset of the Great
Depression, did the U.S. Government begin to systematically
affect the daily lives of its citizens in the form of support to
farmers, regulation of markets, mediation of labor disputes, and
aid to the aged and infirm.
Despite this relative expansion, the focus of the government
remained traditionally inward throughout the decade in response
to the overwhelming domestic economic threat to national
security. Thus, while maintaining a respectable navy, there was
no attempt by the United States to arm itself in order to deal
with other states in this period. And, in fact, the U.S. Army in
1938 was smaller than that of Rumania. In addition, the American
diplomatic corps was relatively new and only professional in
part, with the posting of most ambassadors determined by the size
of their campaign contributions. At the same time, there were no
secret intelligence services to speak of except for a few
cryptanalysts. As a result, the principal agencies for the
foreign component of national security--the Departments of State,
War and Navy--were housed in what today is the Old Executive
Office Building and in the World War I "tempos," the "temporary"
buildings constructed in 1917 on Constitution Avenue that were
still being used in the Eisenhower administration. On the other
side of the White House, the Department of the Treasury alone was
situated in an edifice of almost equivalent space to the Old
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Executive Office Building, while the other agencies concerned
with the domestic component of national security--Commerce,
Labor, Agriculture and Justice--occupied the grand neoclassical
structures along 14th Street and Constitution Avenue.14
Despite the Hudson Valley patrician sitting in the White
House during this period, the Washington that existed at the end
of the interwar years was a middle class town with a middle class
government staffed by employees of modest incomes and ambitions.
It was a town in which people routinely bought used, not new,
Chevrolets, a town in which Raleigh Haberdasher on F Street could
suggest in an advertisement that a man with an office job really
should have more than one suit. And when war came, as David
Brinkley has pointed out, the need to alter the form of
government to fit the expanding function of a nation that defined
its security in increasingly globalist terms transformed
Washington itself.
A languid Southern town with a pace so slow that much
of it simply closed down for the summer grew almost
overnight into a crowded, harried, almost frantic
metropolis struggling desperately to assume the mantle
of global power, moving haltingly and haphazardly and
only partially successfully to change itself into the
capital of the free world.15
In World War II, U.S. governmental form and function
adjusted to the exigencies of the greatest cataclysm in world
history, and the personalities and leadership styles of the
leaders. Early on, the government made the decision to rely on
what were essentially still private institutions for defense
production. The success of that effort enhanced the standing of
these institutions. In contrast, the negative experience with
wartime government control weakened whatever enthusiasm there had
ever been for comprehensive state economic management.16
At the same time, the political-military direction of the
war took its own unique turn. In 1903, the Army-Navy Joint Board
had created reforms to encourage the interservice coordination
that had been lacking in the Spanish-American War. But these
reforms were insufficient for the complexities of high command in
leading the global coalition in World War II. Given the immensity
of that conflict as well as the need for increased coordination
with the extremely efficient British civilian and military
staffs, it was not surprising that the United States created a
wartime command structure that resembled Great Britain's. But the
resemblance only went so far. For FDR's skillful and enthusiastic
exercise of his autocratic war powers was only superficially
similar to that of Churchill, who despite his commanding
position, worked through his collegial cabinet or war cabinet to
arrive at key decisions and only after the most stringent
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examination and discussion by the Chiefs of Staff and appropriate
subcommittees. Such open debate in the wartime Roosevelt system
only occurred at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level, if at all. All
this placed enormous focus and emphasis on the strategic
leadership of one man.17
COLD WAR
Change and Continuity.

National Interests and the Concept of National Security.
While fighting World War II and making preparations for the
peace, U.S. leaders continued to expand the concept of national
security and used its terminology for the first time to explain
America's relationship to the world. The background for this
change involved the experience and understanding by these leaders
of the massive technological and political transformations set in
train by the war. To begin with, the European-centered
international system had ceased to exist even as the United
States emerged as a hegemonic power that appeared to demand a
global role. "The world," John McCloy reported as early as the
fall of 1945 after a global inspection trip, "looks to the United
States as the one stable country to ensure the security of the
world."18 Added to this were the indelible lessons associated with
the causes of the recently ended conflict, particularly what came
to be known as the "Munich syndrome." That conference represented
for an entire generation of Americans what could happen when
nations passively looked on when aggression occurred, as they had
in Hitler's initial dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in September
1938. In the coming years, it would be a small conceptual step
from the appeasement of the Nazi leader's "salami tactics" to
that associated with the "domino theory."
At the same time, the linkage of national security to the
primary core national interest of survival had grown stronger.
For most of U.S. history, the physical security of the
continental United States had not been in jeopardy. But by 1945,
this invulnerability was rapidly diminishing with the advent of
the long-range bomber, the atom bomb, and the expectation of what
the ballistic missile would accomplish. Given these changes,
there was a general perception that the future would not allow
time to mobilize, that preparation would have to become something
permanent. For the first time, American leaders would have to
deal with the essential paradox of national security faced by the
Roman Empire and other great powers in the intervening centuries:
Si vis pacem, para bellum--If you want peace, prepare for war.
This, as Hanson Baldwin noted at the time, would require changes
in American domestic institutions as radical as those in the
strategic environment:
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Total war means total effort, and the peacetime
preparations for it must be as comprehensive, at least
in outline form, as the execution of it. Consequently
the effects of total war transcend the period of
hostilities; they wrench and distort and twist the body
politic and the body economic not only after a war (as
we are now seeing) but prior to war (as we shall soon
see).19
Allied to the concept of preparedness was the emerging idea
that national security required all elements of national power,
not just military, to be in place in peace as well as war. "We
are in a different league now," Life Magazine proclaimed in 1945.
"How large the subject of security has grown, larger than a
combined Army and Navy. . . ."20 And a year later, this was echoed
by Ferdinand Eberstadt, a key architect of the emerging
institutional changes in Washington, who observed that most
policymakers dealing with national security believed "that
foreign policy, military and domestic economic resources should
be closely tied together."21 This linkage of national security to
so many interdependent factors, whether political and economic or
psychological and military, also led to a more expansive concept,
with the subjective boundaries of security pushed out further
into the world, encompassing more geography and thereby more
issues and problems. In this context, developments anywhere could
be perceived to have an automatic and direct impact on U.S. core
interests. By 1948, President Truman was applying to the entire
world the words directed in earlier times to the Western
Hemisphere: "The loss of independence by any nation adds directly
to the insecurity of the United States and all free nations."22
This expansive interpretation of national security, however,
was not preordained. There was, for example, always the
possibility of returning to a primarily domestic definition. One
reason was the continued tension in American life between
individualism and the emerging machine culture. This tension was
not resolved by either the war or the subsequent Fair Deal and
was exacerbated by the Republican victory in the 1946
congressional elections that initiated a period of intense
partisan domestic politics. As a consequence, much like the
1920s, inflation, strikes, and special interests conflicts
buffeted the country. The cessation of hostilities ended abruptly
the requirement for a 48-hour work week; and soon unions
throughout the nation were demanding higher pay as compensation
for reduced hours. In 1946, approximately 4,600,000 workers were
involved in work stoppages that lost more than 115,000,000 mandays of labor. Nevertheless, a purely domestic focus on national
security could not be sustained, particularly since the emerging
concept of national security in global terms increasingly
appeared as a major means of restoring the wartime feeling of a
common national purpose.23
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That global approach was initially focused on the
international economy. Economic designs and economic instruments
dominated Washington's early post-war geostrategic thinking. The
experience with Nazi Germany's expansion prior to World War II
was a reminder for U.S. leaders that European markets, workers,
and industrial capacity should be perceived as strategic as well
as economic assets, and that control of these assets by hostile
powers could increase their capacity to wage war at the expense
of U.S. national security. All this was reinforced by the postwar focus on a peace dividend as the Republicans led the popular
demand for a speedy military and industrial demobilization. So
rapid was the pace that one month after the end of the war, the
Joint Strategic Survey Committee could report that "a year or
more would be required to reconstruct our military position at a
fraction of its recent power."24 The result in the early post-war
period was a military in disarray that appeared unlikely to
provide the means for the new Truman government to emphasize the
use of force in maintaining the nation's security. Moreover,
Republican congressional leaders, despite their increasingly
partisan, acrimonious relationship with the President, were
determined to let that acrimony end at the water's edge. This was
particularly evident in their agreement with the new Secretary of
State, General Marshall, that priority should go to the economic
recovery of Europe. This economic focus was captured in the aid
program for Greece and Turkey and most dramatically in the
Marshall Plan for Western Europe.25
And yet within a few years, another outcome concerning the
concept of U.S. national security emerged that left, in Ernest
May's description, "the military establishment transcendent and
military-security concerns dominant. . . ."26 A major factor in
this shift was the evidence of a Soviet military buildup. The
1949 Soviet explosion of a nuclear device only reinforced the
image of the threat. Equally important, the detonation supported
the key argument made the next year in NSC-68 that the U.S.
nuclear capability had been neutralized, and that there was a
concomitant need to drastically expand the standing conventional
military forces of the United States. The Korean War appeared to
bear out the assumptions of NSC-68. The result was a massive
military increase with the expectation of an indefinite period of
intense danger to U.S. national security. Whereas the military
budget for FY 1950 had accounted for less than one-third of
government expenditures and less than 5 percent of GNP, by FY 53
that budget represented more than 60 percent of government
outlays and more than 12 percent of GNP.27 At the same time, the
rise of "McCarthyism" made it difficult to question the need for
a national security establishment focused on a virtual state of
war in peace with a nation which, as Colin Gray has pointed out,
became the all consuming focus of U.S. national security.
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The capabilities, declarations, and actions that
comprised U.S. national security policy made sense only
with reference to the Soviet threat. That threat, as
variously defined over the years, was not a factor
helping to define the purposes of U.S. policy, grand
strategy, and military strategy. It was the factor.28
There was in all this a kind of adverse synergism that
linked the more expansive concept of U.S. national security to
Soviet-American relations. On the one hand, the perception of
Soviet intentions affected the manner in which U.S. governmental
elites defined national security. On the other, the increasingly
broader concept of America's security had an effect on the
interpretation of the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet
Union. At the same time, the very ambiguity of the new term,
"national security," helped create a means for politicians and
officials to bridge the gap between domestic and foreign policy.
For politicians, focused primarily on domestic audiences, the
juxtaposition of godless, totalitarian communism with the
promotion of U.S. values was invaluable. For executive branch
officials, the geopolitical linkage of Soviet moves to American
and allied physical security was equally beneficial. "Our
national security can only be assured on a very broad and
comprehensive front," James Forrestal argued in front of a Senate
Committee on the unification of the services in 1945. "I like
your words 'national security'," one senator replied.29 The result
was a concept of national security, as Daniel Yergin has
observed, that fundamentally revised America's perception of its
relationship to the rest of the world.
The nation was to be permanently prepared. America's
interests and responsibilities were unrestricted and
global. National security became a guiding rule. . . .
It lay at the heart of a new and sometimes intoxicating
vision.30

Grand Strategy. Out of that vision of national security
emerged a grand strategic consensus that the Soviet Union must be
contained on the Eurasian land mass. Throughout the Cold War,
this consensus survived arguments over whether the resultant
policy should be particularist or universalist and whether the
primary threat was the ideological menace of communism or the
geopolitical form of the Soviet great power. Even Vietnam could
not break the consensus, producing traumatic questions on the
wisdom of that intervention but not of containment. There was,
however, a price to pay for the consensus. The ability of each
administration to remain in office after 1945 became dependent on
reducing the tension between the foreign and domestic components
of U.S. national security, a tension that was increasingly
exacerbated by the requirements of containment. As a consequence,
the application of national ways and means to implement grand
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strategy during the Cold War fell into two distinct patterns
oriented on this national security tension. These patterns
reflected the strategic paradox that actions designed to minimize
cost tend to escalate risks, while those aimed at minimizing
risks tend to drive up costs. The alternation between these two
patterns--cost-minimization and risk-minimization-- had profound
social, political, economic, and military implications throughout
and beyond the Cold War.31
The initial pattern of minimizing costs in dealing with the
grand strategy was a natural outgrowth of the cutback in national
means as the United States began its traditional postwar
demobilization. This approach to containment was favored by
George Kennan because it allowed the United States, as he
perceived it, to choose not only the time and place of responding
to the threat, but the appropriate elements of power as well. The
basic requirement of the strategy, he pointed out, was to
distinguish between vital and peripheral interests, the sine qua
non for avoiding reactive policy. At the heart of this approach
was Kennan's belief that any attempt to generate enough means to
meet all possible threats in implementing the grand strategy
could bankrupt the country or at the very least have seriously
adverse societal impacts. Political authority might not long
remain with a leader who sacrificed national economic prosperity
on the altar of indiscriminate containment.32
The Truman administration officially promulgated the
national security strategy of containment in the March 1947
Truman Doctrine. But despite the apparent open-ended, global
commitment of U.S. means implicit in that strategy, that
administration quickly adopted the cost-minimizing pattern of
implementation. The basic problem with the pattern, however, as
Korea and Vietnam would prove, was that the strategic premise of
making rational distinctions between vital and peripheral
interests did not take into consideration psychological
insecurities, always a problem in an open pluralistic democracy.
Losses of peripheral areas to Soviet domination might be
psychologically damaging in more vital ones. For such scenarios,
minimizing costs appeared to add the possible loss of deterrent
credibility to the concomitant increase in risk. These
insecurities, as John Lewis Gaddis has pointed out, "could as
easily develop from the distant sound of falling dominoes as from
the rattling of sabres next door."33
The second pattern of strategic ways and means--riskminimization--also emerged in the Truman years, outlined in NSC68. That document officially enshrined the strategic objective of
containing the expansion of the Soviet Union for an indefinite
period until domestic pressures brought the Kremlin "to the point
of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted
international standards."34 But NSC-68 outlined a risk-minimizing
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strategy based on the fundamental assumption that the United
States could generate enough means to defend its interests
wherever they existed. Interests, in fact, were a function of the
threat, and since that threat could be anywhere, there was no
need to accept the risks involved in attempting to differentiate
those interests that were vital from those that were not. As the
risks were lowered, however, the costs inevitably increased. The
decision to respond wherever aggression occurred but to limit
that response to the level of provocation encountered placed the
United States in a reactive mode, leaving it to potential
adversaries to determine how and under what circumstances
American resources would be expended. As the United States, in
its first encounter with the complexities of limited war, saw the
Korean War drag on, public frustration mounted. With the prospect
of indefinitely high expenditures of men and materiel for a type
of conflict alien to American tradition, this public frustration
began to erode the authority of the Truman administration to
pursue its approach to grand strategy.
The Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look" was clearly a costminimizing reaction to the risk-minimizing strategy of the last
years of the Truman administration. It was also a strategy,
however, that Eisenhower believed was the only way to achieve
balanced national security focused on all three core national
interests. Like Kennan, he perceived that any attempt to generate
enough means to protect undifferentiated interests against all
possible threats would require a degree of fiscal austerity that
would alter American society--that any attempt at absolute riskfree security might destroy what the United States was trying to
achieve. For Eisenhower, ever conscious of the tension between
foreign and domestic policy, national security and economic
stability went hand in hand. He remained convinced that if the
American public perceived the cost of internationalism in the
grand strategy as indefinite national sacrifice, the result would
be isolationism. As a consequence, no one more eloquently than
this former professional soldier tied together the domestic and
foreign implications of the national security state as it emerged
in the long twilight war.
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every
rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft
from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are
cold and are not clothed. . . . The cost of one modern
heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more
than 30 cities. It is two electric power plants, each
serving a town of 60,000 population. It is two fine,
fully equipped hospitals. It is some 50 miles of
concrete highway. We pay for a single fighter plane
with a half million bushels of wheat. We pay for a
single destroyer with new homes that could have housed
more than 8,000 people.35
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Subsequent approaches to the implementation of containment
oscillated over the years between the two extremes of costminimizing and risk-minimizing. These shifts were due primarily
to public perceptions of how well each administration achieved an
equilibrium between the domestic and foreign elements of national
security policy while realizing the grand strategic objective of
containment. In any event, even when the pendulum swung toward
risk minimization requiring active peacetime forces larger than
the United States had ever before maintained, they were not
nearly so large or so costly as those that would have been
required under different strategic assumptions. Reliance on
nuclear weapons caused military planners to be comfortable with
lesser conventional capabilities than they might in other
circumstances have been willing to accept. Moreover, the
perception throughout the Cold War of technological advantages
enjoyed by the United States and its allies in terms of
conventional weapons made it easier to forego a national security
strategy based on matching the Soviets and their surrogates plane
for plane and tank for tank.36
Form and Function.
After 1945, the form of the U.S. Government adjusted to the
functions required by the changing concept of national security.
That adjustment was initially bound up in the American experience
in World War II, which indicated that institutions designed for
an old era would not be adequate for the new. Post-war hearings
on the Pearl Harbor disaster concluded that U.S. intelligence
procedures were insufficient for modern day security challenges,
particularly with the new American status as a global power.
Another legacy of the war was the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an ad
hoc wartime creation designed to provide some unity of advice to
the President and to act as a counterweight in dealings with a
similar institution long used by the British military. Not only
did the Joint Chiefs still lack formal authorization in the wake
of World War II, but there was also increased pressure within and
without the military for a major reorganization that would grant
the Air Force independent status and unify the armed services.
Added to this was the fact that many citizens perceived that the
Pearl Harbor debacle was due in part to the failure of the U.S.
Army and Navy to cooperate. Congressional investigations of the
war effort also repeatedly uncovered waste and inefficiency due
to the absence of interservice coordination. Senator Truman had
been the chairman of the chief investigating committee and, as
President, supported unification of the armed services as a means
of improving "the antiquated defense setup."37
To counter the unification momentum, Secretary of the Navy
James Forrestal called on Ferdinand Eberstadt, a pioneer in Wall
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Street mutual fund activities and a close friend of many years,
to chair a committee on the subject as well as post-war
organization for national security. The Eberstadt Report of
September 1945 directly addressed the expanded perception of
national security. "The changing content and scope of the phrase
'national security' is apparent from a contrast of our
international commitments and responsibilities after World War I
and World War II." These commitments, in turn, reflected "present
concepts of our national security in terms of world security."
And that security, the report concluded, would require a country
permanently prepared with "an alert, smoothly-working and
efficient machine," to use political, military and economic
elements of national power to meet any threats.38
Instead of unification of the services, the Eberstadt Report
emphasized "a complete realignment of our governmental
organization" and the coordination by means of these new
institutions to prepare the United States for "waging peace as
well as war." The emphasis was on adversarial collaboration in
national security in keeping with Eberstadt's belief in the
corporate, neo-capitalist structures that were part of his
Progressive and New Era organizational experience. "Separate
departments provide a greater representation of specialized
knowledge, they provide a greater aggregation of experienced
judgment and ensure representation of varying viewpoints." A
"Council of Common Defense," later renamed the National Security
Council (NSC), would allow top-level advisers in the executive
branch to exchange information and opinions on a continuous basis
and to coordinate the formulation of national security policy.
The report also recommended the formal establishment of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and a National Security Resource Board focused on
the linkage of industrial readiness to military preparedness.
Finally, Eberstadt and his committee called for a central
intelligence agency and three coordinate, not unified services,
each headed by a civilian.39
The Eberstadt Report essentially became the framework for
the National Security Act of 1947. As a result, the legislation
represented a series of compromises within the executive branch
and between that branch and Congress, all of which delayed the
full linkage of government form and function in terms of the
evolving concept of national security. In fact, there was no
definition of the term in the act, and the concept remained one
that would be defined through action and, tautologically, by
those who exercised power bureaucratically and militarily. Prior
to the National Security Act, the unification controversy had
helped to stimulate the expression of an enlarged concept of
national security. After 1947, the controversy initially held
back a more forceful expression of America's immense power.
Increasingly, debates by the services took on the form of
theologians' disputes concerning holy texts and only strengthened
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the tendency of each service to create its own defense policy.
Until 1950, this interservice warfare used up all the energies of
the military not consumed in the efforts to demobilize. The
result was that the initial creation of grand strategy to meet
evolving national security needs after World War II took form
much faster than U.S. defense policy.40
As the concept of U.S. national security became increasingly
defined in military terms after 1950, there was a growing
militarization of the American government and an increase of
presidential and executive branch power normally associated with
wartime. In the wake of the Korean conflict, the State Department
shifted its focus more and more to military security. As a
consequence, American Secretaries of State spent an increasing
amount of time in the ensuing decades on issues concerning levels
of and arrangements for forward deployed U.S. military forces;
amounts of military aid authorized for client states; and in the
last half of the Cold War, arrangements for nuclear arms control.
In a similar manner, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
the intelligence community, focused on the needs of a growing
decisionmaking elite and an expanding military, increased in size
and function. Presidential orders, for example, created the
National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and
the National Reconnaissance Office--all placed specifically under
the management of the military establishment.41
There were similar developments at the White House in terms
of increasing structure and organizational precedence oriented on
political-military issues primarily through the development of
the NSC. In the early Truman years, that organization was merely
one part of the Executive Office of the President, only sparingly
used by the Chief Executive. After 1950, the NSC became the
government's principal steering mechanism, with real
decisionmaking invariably involving the Assistants to the
President for National Security Affairs. That post increased
exponentially in importance during the Kennedy administration,
reaching new peaks in the Nixon and Carter years when the
National Security Advisers often brushed aside the Secretaries of
State. By the end of the Cold War, the business hours of the
Presidents were occupied primarily with the problems vetted and
brought to them by means of the NSC system. And, in fact, as
Ernest May has pointed out, by that time "the main business of
the United States government had become the development,
maintenance, positioning, exploitation, and regulation of
military forces."42
With the military focus on national security, the U.S.
public came to accept a mix of real and potential infringements
on its civil liberties. There were also domestic costs in the
effects of the twilight war on government programs ranging from
the Fair Deal and the New Frontier to the Great Society. And yet
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no "garrison state" emerged, due primarily to the inclusion of
nuclear deterrence as part of the grand strategy of containment.
As a result, Eisenhower curtailed and then cut the entire
industrial planning program extant in the Korean conflict by the
end of his administration. The demise of the National Security
Resource Board was symbolic of the fact that the Federal
Government had abandoned any attempts to keep all relevant
sectors of the economy fine-tuned for mobilization and war, and
had shifted its primary spending focus on weapons and research to
contracting with privately-owned firms and universities. The
privatization of defense production remained in effect for the
rest of the Cold War. And while money and manpower for military
purposes were extracted by the state, the levels remained far
lower than those associated with a garrison state and certainly
much lower than came to be associated with the USSR.43
Nevertheless, there was an enormous expansion of the armed
forces as the Department of Defense evolved. The day after
passage of the National Security Act, Congress appointed a
bipartisan commission to monitor the organizational changes in
the executive branch as a result of that act. The commission's
task force on national security was headed by the ubiquitous
Ferdinand Eberstadt who submitted a 121-page report to Congress
in January 1949 that found the "National Security Organization
established by the National Security Act of 1947 [to be] soundly
constructed, but not yet working well."44 In particular, the
National Defense Establishment was, in Eisenhower's description,
"little more than a weak confederation of sovereign military
units."45 The amendments of 1949, 1953, and 1958 to the National
Security Act were the result. The last amendment represented a
concept shared by President Eisenhower and Congress of a strong
Secretary of Defense with one chain of authority to military
departments and another to joint components. The military
departments were to prepare for combat (organize, train, equip)
and maintain those forces (logistics, administration, other
support) once committed. The Joint Chiefs, with the assistance of
the Joint Staff, would advise the President and other members of
the NSC and plan for and employ forces provided by the services
to the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the unified and specified
commands for the conduct of military missions assigned by the
President.
Despite the de jure organizational model of the 1958
amendment, the services were unwilling to relinquish their
traditional operational functions of planning and warfighting to
a joint system. The result was continued service domination of
both the force employment and maintenance missions in DoD at the
expense of joint institutions, whether in the form of service
vetoes of JCS advice or of weak, ineffectual unified commands. In
Vietnam, this led to JCS interservice brokerage of budgets,
missions, and even targets. At the same time, Secretary MacNamara
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and his civilian analysts substituted the bean counting of the
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) for strategic
judgment and began the spread of their own shallow rationalism
among their military-bureaucratic antagonists. That a system
like PPBS could not substitute for organizational deficiencies
and the lack of a comprehensive national security strategy was
captured in Henry Kissinger's scathing judgment of MacNamara and
his subordinates:
He overemphasized the quantitative aspects of defense
planning; by neglecting intangible psychological and
political components he aimed for predictability that
was illusory and caused needless strains to our
alliances. His eager young associates hid their moral
convictions behind a seemingly objective method of
analysis which obscured that their questions too often
predetermined the answers and that these answers led to
a long-term stagnation in our military technology.46
One result of Vietnam was increased congressional attention
to defense aspects of national security affairs, facilitated also
by the proliferation of subcommittees and the expansion of
supporting staffs. This led in turn to the micro-management of
budgetary matters which triggered a similar reaction in the DoD.
"The overwhelming focus on the annual budget to the neglect of
the longer-term," Robert Art has pointed out, "occurred in the
Pentagon to a large extent because it happened first in
Congress."47 On a more positive note, it was Congress that
returned to the legislative model of 1958 to designate the
Chairman as the primary military adviser, to create a Vice
Chairman and a joint personnel system, and to provide the
requisite power to the warfighting CINCs. The 1986 GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, however, did
not focus on jointness as the basic organizing principle. Instead
the emphasis on joint institutions was designed to achieve a
counterweight to the services that had been suggested in the 1958
amendment: the balance between the maintenance and the employment
of forces that was the actual underlying organizational
principle. In any event, the resultant joint effectiveness of
American forces by the end of the Cold War stood in sharp
contrast to the situation at the zenith of the Royal Navy's rule
of the sea under the Pax Britannica, when Bismarck noted that if
the British army should land on the coast of Prussia, he would
have the local police arrest it.48
The evolution of the Department of Defense demonstrated how
the Cold War consensus concerning the primacy of military means
to provide national security often narrowed the debate to weapon
systems and defense budgets. This militarization of the American
government meant that by the 1950s, with the exception of the
Secretary of the Treasury, the heads of domestic agencies had
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become second-tier officials. The dominant positions in
Washington included the heads of the State Department, the
Defense Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency, as well
as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President's National
Security Advisor. Over the years, as Arthur Schlesinger has
pointed out, these organizations developed vested bureaucratic
interest in the military orientation of the long twilight war.
The Cold War conferred power, money, prestige, and
public influence on these agencies and on the people
who ran them. By the natural law of bureaucracies,
their stake in the conflict steadily grew. Outside of
government, arms manufacturers, politicians,
professors, publicists, pontificators, and demagogues
invested careers and fortunes in the Cold War.49
All that notwithstanding, the evolving form of the U.S.
Government after the National Security Act of 1947 was a creative
response to the evolving Cold War concept of national security
set against a backdrop of Soviet militarism, global reliance on
the United States, and dizzying developments in nuclear and other
military technologies. In achieving the grand strategic function
of containing the USSR, the growth of the U.S. national security
state proceeded, at least in part, dialectically with the Soviet
"total security state." Moreover, those factors usually cited as
contributing to U.S. weakness as a nation actually eased the
power of the national security state. Despite a compelling
external threat, the openness of American political institutions
to pressures from interest groups and the nature of national
ideology worked together to put very real limits on the power of
the U.S. Government over the society and the economy. On the
other hand, the often cited strength of the Soviet state inherent
in its ability to mobilize societal means for external objectives
appears to have been the long-term reason for its demise.50
POST-COLD WAR
Change and Continuity.

National Interests and the Concept of National Security. The
end of the Cold War has required the United States to think about
the concept of national security at a depth not required for two
generations. The core of that concept remains the preservation of
the United States as a free, economically prosperous nation with
its fundamental institutions and values intact. Within the
continuity of that core centered on primary national interests,
American values and institutions have changed and will continue
to change throughout American history. George Washington's
"nation," for example, was primarily comprised of scattered
agrarian settlements, consisting of people who had, as Washington
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pointed out in his Farewell Address, "the same religion, manners,
habits, and political principles."51 And among the more prominent
American institutions of that time was Negro slavery.
The tensions between change and continuity concerning U.S.
national security have been exacerbated by a series of forces and
trends that emerged in the Cold War. Revolutions in technology,
communications, information, and transportation have drastically
altered concepts of time and distance in the consideration of
fundamental U.S. national interests. These revolutions have
fueled a growing global interdependence, particularly in the
areas of economics and the environment. At the same time a
multicentric world of transnational actors ranging from
multinational corporations to terrorist groups has emerged to
challenge the primacy of the state-centric world. In the wake of
the Cold War, these developments have played out against the
traditional tug-of-war between the foreign and domestic
components of national security.
The physical security of the United States is still
perceived in globalist terms focused on threats that menace the
freedom and independence of nations that the United States
brought over the years into the "empire for liberty." The issue
of NATO expansion, of course, only highlights the post-Cold War
dilemma of deciding who belongs in that empire. At the same time,
many of the forces and trends are beginning to produce a more
contracted concept of national security in terms of the physical
defense of the United States. It is increasingly possible for
small and relatively weak actors to strike the United States with
technology such as long-range ballistic missiles and weapons of
mass destruction. Moreover, as the 1993 bombing of the New York
World Trade Center demonstrated, technologies of low-level
warfare ranging from car bombs to computer hacking will also have
an impact. One result is a return in part to a focus on the
defense proper of the United States--a case of change producing
continuity, whether that continuity is with the attempts at
continental air defense in the 1950s and the beginning of
Ballistic Defense Missile development in the 1960s, or the
fortifications of American ports throughout the 19th century and
the dominance of the coast artillery branch in the period between
the two world wars.52
In a similar manner, there is the continued linkage in the
post-Cold War era of U.S. economic prosperity and the promotion
of values to an expansive global concept of national security.
Increasing economic interdependence has ensured continued
American participation in the post-World War II Bretton Woods
arrangements as well as in new regional and global economic
organizations. The promotion of democracy world-wide, facilitated
by the communication and information revolutions, is linked in
turn to the free trade basis for American economic prosperity as
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well as a general perception that an increase in such forms of
government enhances world stability and thereby U.S. national
security. At the same time, however, there has been a traditional
post-war refocus on domestic economic and social problems, many
of them exacerbated by U.S. efforts in the Cold War. As a result,
there is a growing public perception of domestic threats to
American national security, whether it be the national debt,
drugs and crime, or the crisis in education, the expanding
underclass and the rot in the inner cities. That this perception
can have a zero sum continuity with the foreign component of
national security reminiscent of other times in U.S. history was
demonstrated in the questions posed by Pat Buchanan as the Cold
War wound down. "What doth it profit a nation," he asked, "if it
gain the whole world, and lose its own soul?"
What are we getting for . . . foreign aid? Why, 46
years after World War II, are we defending Germany and
Japan while they steal our markets? Why must we pacify
the Persian Gulf when women walking dogs in Central
Park are slashed to death by bums?53
The continuity of the zero sum approach notwithstanding, a
changing world has dissolved a great deal of the customary
antinomies central to the debate on U.S. national security. Many
domestic issues such as economic competitiveness, environmental
degradation and financial indebtedness now have key international
components. Nevertheless, an expanded national security agenda
will require more not less hard trade-offs dealing with such
areas as energy, fiscal policy, and exploding entitlements. In
such an environment, denial and rhetoric are poor substitutes for
meaningful choices, all reminiscent of a Roman historian's
complaint concerning the decadence of his age that Roman citizens
"can neither bear their ills nor their cures."54 The fact is that
there is not an automatic symbiotic relationship between the
foreign and domestic components of national security. It will not
be enough, Ernest May concludes,
to say that security has a domestic face while domestic
betterment has an external face. The choice affects the
precedence of issues to be addressed. It also affects
the ends to be sought. What makes the nation stronger
abroad may not be what makes consciences most easy. Nor
what makes life more comfortable. And what eases
consciences at home, or creates comfort, may not
conduce to making the United States stronger or more
competitive abroad.55

Grand Strategy. The May 1997 National Security Strategy for
a New Century reflects the tension between change and continuity
in the evolving concept of American national security. There is
the continued specific rejection of isolationism as a grand
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strategy, directly linked to the lessons of the interwar years in
which "the United States squandered Allied victory in World War I
when it . . . turned inward."56 And there is the continuity in the
alternative, as President Clinton points out, back to "the start
of the Cold War when we chose engagement over isolation."57 But it
is precisely in the concept of national security in terms of
global engagement that the tensions between grand strategic
change and continuity emerge. Should the United States, for
example, attempt to maintain the unipolar primacy with which it
emerged from the Cold War? The urge to be primus solus reached
its high point in the Bush administration. Since then, there has
been a general recognition of the risks associated with such a
strategy and of the fact, as the current National Security
Strategy points out, that the United States "cannot hedge against
every conceivable future threat." Nevertheless, that document
also stresses the need for American leadership abroad, which the
President concludes, "remains as strong as ever," and the need to
"act on our own when we must" in an increasingly intractable
world.58
Despite this nod to primacy, selective engagement continues
to emerge as the principal U.S. post-Cold War strategy, still
tied to the three core U.S. national interests and to the linkage
of the foreign and domestic components of national security.
We know there must be limits to America's involvement
in the world. We must be selective in the use of our
capabilities, and the choices we make always must be
guided by advancing our objectives of a more secure,
prosperous and free America.59
At the same time, there is the continuity in selective engagement
of the focus on great power war in Eurasia as a danger to the
United States. Moreover, as American national security interest
in the Middle East demonstrates, ethnic conflicts and regional
competitions among minor states matter to the degree that they
could cause great power security competition. All this mitigates
the "selectivity" of the strategy, since a great deal of the
world matters to the United States, and since there are no
definitive criteria concerning great power relations in these
areas. And even those areas of obvious peripheral interest, if
not addressed by the United States, may affect American
credibility and thus undermine efforts to pursue more important
interests. As a result, selective engagement continues to require
a substantial American military force.60
This requirement has also led to the continued inclusion of
a strategy of cooperative security. Practical experience in
interventions such as Somalia has caused the Clinton
administration to back away from the conceptual underpinnings of
such a strategy concerning the indivisibility of peace. And in
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fact what has emerged runs strategically parallel to selective
engagement--the evolution of collective security from the choice
between sometimes and always to sometimes and never. At the same
time, the multitude of new threats has caused the United States
to continue to link national security to bilateral and
multilateral cooperative security coalitions. "No one nation can
defeat these threats alone," the National Security Strategy
concludes. "Accordingly, a central thrust of our strategy is to
adapt our security relationships with key nations around the
world to combat these threats to common interests."61
This "uneasy amalgam" of strategies in both post-Cold War
administrations has internal contradictions concerning the type
of global engagement, the means to be employed for that
engagement, and the degree of autonomy to be maintained.62
Ironically, a major cause is the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense
Reorganization Act which created the annual requirement for the
President to submit "a comprehensive report on the national
security strategy of the United States. . . ." At that time,
containment was the U.S. grand strategy. As a consequence, the
requirement focused on "worldwide interests, goals, and
objectives" and on the "foreign policy, worldwide commitments,
and national defense capabilities of the United States. . . ."
This emphasis on the foreign and defense components of national
security was only indirectly mitigated by the requirement to
address the "adequacy of the capabilities . . . to carry out the
national security of the United States, including an evaluation
of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of national
power. . . ."63
Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly in the
Clinton administration, the national security strategy has also
begun to emphasize the importance of America's domestic wellbeing. But that well-being is only addressed as a rationale for
U.S. global engagement in an increasingly interdependent world,
whether it be enhancing American competitiveness and access to
foreign markets, strengthening macroeconomic coordination, or
providing for energy and environmental security. And despite the
fact that the term "enlargement" has been dropped from the
current document, the promotion of U.S. values is still linked to
a global free market basis for U.S. prosperity as well as to
global stability and security. What is missing in all this are
specific sections that address the most pressing domestic social
and economic threats to American national security, the proposals
for programs to meet those threats, and the interrelationship and
trade-offs between those programs and the grand strategies not
only of primacy, selective engagement and cooperative security,
but of isolationism as well.
Domestic politics are changing in the post-Cold War era.
"Baby Boomers" are approaching retirement against the backdrop of
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a massive entitlement explosion. At the same time, a larger and
larger cohort of politically active adults will have dim
recollections of the long twilight war that preoccupied the
United States for two generations. In such a milieu, public
support for the continuity of the expanded concept of national
security will be harder to sustain without a richer, more
complete approach to grand strategy.
Form and Function.
Ernest May has described what happens when form and function
grow apart in capitals of nation-states as a result of historical
change:
In Westminster, the houses of Parliament and Buckingham
Palace--both structures of the Victorian era--and the
Georgian and Regency offices along Whitehall are
buildings for a seat of empire, not for the capital of
a middle-ranking member of the European Community. The
drab, modest government office blocks of Tokyo and Bonn
seem equally ill-suited, given that they serve the
second and third ranking powers of the economic world.
None of these capitals vies with Vienna, where the
magnificent Hofburg is the seat of government for a
republic smaller than Indiana. . . .64
This has not been a problem in U.S. history. The form of the
American government has been remarkably consistent with whatever
grand strategic function has been devised to meet evolving
concepts of national security. The domestic focus of governmental
form throughout much of that history was in keeping with the
grand strategy of isolationism even when that strategy became
increasingly disconnected from the realities of national
security. After 1945, Washington continued its wartime expansion
as a global diplomatic-military headquarters designed to further
the grand strategic function of containing a hostile, secretive,
heavily armed superpower. The continuity in form remains, focused
in the current period on the continued U.S. global leadership
role implicit in varying degrees in all three grand strategies.
For the NSC, there is still the requirement to integrate
U.S. foreign, defense, and domestic policies, a need made more
acute because of declining resources in an interdependent
international system of state-centric and multicentric actors,
where issues in all three areas are increasingly blurred. The NSC
will have to adjust to resultant changes in the national agenda
or be relegated to the status of one--not first--among equals in
the interagency process. It will not be an easy transition. In
the economic field, the NSC was clumsy and slow in the early
1980s in dealing with debt default by foreign governments--a

23

major threat to U.S. national security. And NSC staff work even
approaching that normally expended on major political-military
Cold War issues surely would have prevented President Bush's
disastrous January 1992 visit to Japan as an apparent tour guide
shilling for corporate campaign contributors. One result has been
President Clinton's creation by Executive Order of a National
Economic Council (NEC) with a national economic advisor to
coordinate "the economic policymaking process with respect to
domestic and international economic issues."65 As the domestic
component of national security strategy continues to evolve in
its own right, there will be more evolutionary institutional
changes that move the Chief Executive further from the politicalmilitary focus spawned by the Cold War and Presidential
temperament and encouraged by the NSC structure. Such changes may
even include creation of a new domestic council as powerful as
the NSC in terms of stature and claims on Presidential attention.
Certainly the NEC, despite the normal growing pains of a new
institution, has already proven that it provides strengths in a
field for which the President is personally held accountable as
well as the flexibility in the manner of the NSC to accommodate a
wide range of Presidential styles and specific priorities on
issues.66
Ultimately, it is this link to the President that is the key
to how the NSC system will continue to evolve in the post-Cold
War era. The executive branch is held together by the President's
authority, not, as the Eberstadt Report assumed, in a type of
British cabinet solidarity with the President's powers embodied
in a committee. Even at the height of the Iran-Contra scandal,
neither the investigative joint congressional committee nor the
Tower Commission was willing to make recommendations concerning
structural form that would curtail the President's function of
coordinating his own advisors in the complex business of national
security. "Because of the wide latitude in the National Security
Act," the Tower Commission concluded,
the President bears a special responsibility for the
effective performance of the NSC system . . . . The
flaws of procedure and failures of responsibility . . .
do not suggest any inadequacies in the provisions of
the National Security Act of 1947 that deal with the
structure and operation of the NSC system. Forty years
of experience under that Act demonstrate . . . that it
remains a fundamentally sound framework for national
security decisionmaking. It strikes a balance between
formal structure and flexibility to permit each
President to tailor the system to fit his needs.67
Like the NSC, the CIA and the intelligence community are
unique in U.S. history. America has, after all, always fielded
military forces, no matter how small and badly equipped at
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different historical junctures. But the creation of the CIA in
1947 was the beginning of a large standing peacetime intelligence
infrastructure that grew in response to the Cold War and had no
real predecessors. Since the end of that bipolar conflict, the
Soviet threat has disappeared and no comparable threat in
ideology or military power has yet emerged. In the new era,
nevertheless, there is the continuity of the need for
intelligence to ensure that the United States is not placed at a
disadvantage in terms of protecting its national security. But
the expanded concept of that security has also created new secret
information needs whether they concern the flow of narcotics and
weapons, or trade, environment, migration, and disease.68
The key to meeting these new needs lies in the relations
between the executive and legislative branches. In the 1970s,
after exposing CIA assassination plots and other questionable
actions, Congress created the permanent intelligence oversight
committees of the Senate and the House as well as a more exacting
legal structure for intelligence operations. In subsequent years,
many of the recommendations that emerged from commission reports
and legislative initiatives were at least partially incorporated
either in executive orders or in other executive branch
initiatives. It was only natural, then, in the wake of the Cold
War that Congress should lead the way in attempting to reform
intelligence institutions. "It is clear that as the world becomes
more . . . complex and no longer understandable through the prism
of Soviet competition, more intelligence--not less--will be
needed," Senator David Boren, the Chairman of the Senate
Intelligence Panel, argued in 1992. "The answer is . . . to
change the existing community, including the CIA."69
The result was a congressional attempt that year to pass an
omnibus act (Boren-McCurdy) for restructuring and reorganizing
the intelligence community--an intelligence equivalent of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act. The bill caused some debate, but little
action, primarily because of the revolutionary nature of the
proposals. Nevertheless, changes are evolving in the intelligence
community. The Gulf War, for instance, demonstrated how
technological change has increased the merger of tactical and
strategic intelligence. Reports in that conflict from operatives
in the field on the morale of the Republican Guard influenced
policymakers at the highest level. And satellites originally
built to track Soviet ICBMs provided target data to tactical
commanders ranging from pilots to tank commanders. One outcome
was a focus on reorganization that would ensure prompt delivery
of spy photos to the consumer on the ground. At the same time,
DoD established a new Defense Human Intelligence Service, first
used in the 1994 Haitian occupation.70
Above all, the intelligence community is beginning to
respond in the post-Cold War era to the increased blurring of
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foreign and domestic intelligence. Analysis and estimates now
have to address issues ranging from banking and immigration to
disease, climate, and police procedures. This requires more
interaction with the staffs of top policymakers and a continuous
linkage with a wider array of intelligence consumers to include
analysts in liaison offices attached to organizations such as
Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and the Office of the Special Trade
Representative. One consequence is that the process of
classification and dissemination of intelligence is changing in
kind as well as degree. Potential intelligence consumers in the
new era include law-enforcement officers, businessmen, doctors,
and scientists--many not even employed by the government or even
citizens of the United States. Another consequence against the
backdrop of technological innovations is an increase of threats
to privacy. Limitations on those threats which applied when the
principal concern of U.S. national security was the Soviet Union
may dissipate in an environment where enemies can range from
diseases and viruses to the movement of narcotics or migrant
workers.71
It is these types of issues that the executive and
legislative branches must address together. This interaction on
intelligence matters was created and strengthened by the events
of the Cold War. It is a process that continues in the current
transition period. There are very few, if any, states that have
brought as much scrutiny of their governmental intelligence
operations into their parliamentary organization as has the
United States. In the end, the evolutionary transformation of the
intelligence community from its Cold War configuration is the
most practical approach to the difficult task of attempting to
square the circle of maintaining public oversight of clandestine
governmental functions.
The intelligence debate has never approached in scope or
consequences the deliberations on military reform in the late
1970s and early 1980s that eventually led to the 1986 GoldwaterNichols Act. A major reason is that the military reform debate
long preceded the National Security Act while major public debate
on intelligence reform only began in the 1970s. Another reason is
that the rationalization of DoD's joint warfighting
organizational form was consistent with the grand strategic
function of containing a major power on a global basis. In the
full flush of this jointness in the new era, there is continuity
along with change. Goldwater-Nichols has not ended the dual role
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Despite the fact that the Chairman
now has seniority as their spokesman and principal military
advisor to the President, the Joint Chiefs are not only service
chiefs, but members of the council of military advisors to the
Commander-in-Chief. In this regard, the Chairman can cast a
deciding vote, but not one that muzzles the Joint Chiefs.72
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In a similar manner, Goldwater-Nichols was explicit that the
Joint Staff would not become a general staff. As a result,
service staffs provide national military advice and views to the
Joint Staff at the center of the process on behalf of each member
of the Joint Chiefs. It is this input that is the basis for
balanced cohesion within the joint system. Above all, GoldwaterNichols built in an evolutionary manner on the National Security
Act, thus precluding any return to the unification issue. Service
secretaries and service chiefs are still responsible for
recruiting, organizing and equipping forces that bring unique
capabilities to the joint table. "Unique" is the operative word.
"Remember," General Carl Mundy cautions,
that effective jointness means blending the distinct
colors of the services into a rainbow of synergistic
military effectiveness. It does not suggest pouring
them into a single jar and mixing them until they lose
their individual properties and come out as a colorless
paste. No army that has worn purple uniforms ever won a
battle. Balanced military judgment and combat
effectiveness depend upon service individuality,
culture, training, and interpretation of the
battlefield. The essence of jointness is the flexible
blending of service individualities.73
Progress in jointness, however, will not solve other
organizational problems in the new era that stem from reduced
budgets combined with the admixture of three grand strategies
attempting to deal with an expanded concept of national security
unprecedented in U.S. history. The result since the end of the
Cold War has been an almost 40 percent reduction in U.S. military
force structure and budget while the use of that force has
increased 300 percent. The threat of traditional interstate war
is reflected in the U.S. deployment in the Gulf War as well as
the continued forward U.S. presence in Asia, Europe and,
increasingly, the Middle East. At the same time, the U.S.
military has been involved in operations against rogue states
like Ghadaffi's Libya and Noreiga's Panama while providing forces
for noncombatant evacuation, peace and humanitarian operations in
areas ranging from Liberia and Guantanomo Bay to Somalia, Haiti,
and Bosnia. Finally, there has been the military role
domestically in combatting the smuggling of drugs, suppressing
the Los Angeles riots, and providing relief for major disasters
that include wild fires in the west, a hurricane in Florida and
flooding in the mid-west.74
This type of strain is unlikely to end for the U.S. military
because of the internal contradictions in the grand strategic
approaches to protecting American national security. Primacy will
continue to be part of the U.S. global leadership outlook,
particularly in terms of the role played by U.S. security
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guarantees to the principal World War II adversaries. And
selective engagement focused on great power relationships cannot
ignore upheaval in the developing world no matter how robust the
allied relationships under cooperative security. This does not
translate automatically to a role of world policeman. But it does
mean that the United States, if it is to maintain its national
values and its credibility throughout the world, will continue to
identify its national security in part with the open-ended
interest of preserving world order.
As a consequence of this enlarged strategic function, it
will not be possible, as the United States did in the threatbased Cold War, to optimize the form of the American forces for a
full-scale conflict with the expectation that this capability can
deal with any contingency in the developing world that might
occur. Instead, DoD will have to balance a force with
capabilities flexible enough to deal with a widely expanded
concept of national security and the amalgam of three grand
strategies that are unlikely to change in the near future. On the
one hand, this will entail continuing to maintain sufficient
conventional military power to deter symmetrical threats from
regional and potential global powers without assuming away the
problem under the twin rationalizations of coalition warfare and
technological revolutions in military affairs. On the other, DoD
will have to deal with new adversaries such as corporations,
terrorist organizations, tribes and clans, religious groups and
drug cartels. This will require the development of military
capabilities that can prevent and defeat asymmetrical threats
ranging from weapons of mass destruction and information warfare
to environmental sabotage--all posed by these nontraditional
actors to circumvent or undermine America's conventional military
strength while exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities.75
The problem in developing form to meet undifferentiated
functions is always cost. The defense budget is highly visible as
part of discretionary funds, the latter increasingly in decline
in an overall budget that reflects the unwillingness of the
American public and its leaders to make hard choices on issues
such as entitlements. Added to this is the lack of any real peer
threat to the United States for the foreseeable future, and the
difficulty for leaders in making convincing links to the American
public between world order in obscure areas of the globe and the
core U.S. interests of physical security, economic prosperity,
and even promotion of values. One result in the future could be
renewed focus on more domestic DoD involvement. Throughout
American history, the military has remained the ultimate safety
net whether it involved humanitarian relief efforts at the 1871
Chicago fire or those concerned with earthquakes, floods, and
other disasters in the 1990s; or whether the military was
involved in suppression of riots and revolts ranging from Shay's
1786 Rebellion to the 1992 Los Angeles riot. Against the backdrop
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of continued social and economic problems throughout the United
States, the public demand may grow for the military safety net to
be applied to areas such as health and education.76
Such changes will only come about gradually through the
viscosity of Cold War continuity. Given the global requirements
of U.S. national security, the privitization of defense
production that survived both World War II and the Cold War will
continue, albeit in a more rationalized form. The focus of
Defense research and development as well as acquisition is
increasingly turning to industries specializing in new
technologies. This will ensure that modernization of aging
systems will use state-of-the-art technology in pursuit of
balance between near-term missions and future challenges. Equally
important, what the Pentagon calls a revolution in business
affairs is underway in an effort to reengineer DoD's
infrastructure and business practices, to include acquisition
reform, increased out-sourcing and privatizing, and more use of
commercial and dual-use technology as well as of cooperative
development programs with allies.77
In a similar manner, there is nothing to indicate that
Congress will lessen its micromanaging of the Pentagon. Shifting
functions in Congress, of course, will affect institutional form
as they have in the executive branch. And it may be possible in
the future to establish a single committee in each house that
deals with the integration of all the dimensions of security
analogous to an expanded NSC. Such a committee, at the very least
would have to subsume the functions of the Foreign Relations,
Armed Service, and National Security Committees as well as the
international functions of Banking and Finance. But foreign
policy and military affairs are within the purview of 16
congressional committees, and another nine House panels and six
Senate panels consider issues associated with both categories.
Moreover, working against broader considerations even at the
national military strategic level are constituency politics
imbedded in structural policymaking issues ranging from military
installations to defense contracts.78
At the same time, the influence of the military in foreign
policy is likely to continue if not increase because of its
unique ability to manage and provide for such complex
nontraditional missions as peace operations and humanitarian
assistance. Added to this is the military's ability to deal with
the technological revolution--a revolution that has helped to
continue the diminution of the State Department's role in
Washington. Advances in worldwide communication, for instance,
lessen the ability of diplomats to monopolize privileged, firsthand knowledge, while businessmen abroad increasingly use their
own array of resources instead of soliciting aid from their own
embassies. Moreover, even as the JCS Chairman's advisory status
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in high policy sessions has been institutionalized, the
reductions in the relatively minuscule State budget have reached
a point where it is difficult for the department to even
communicate with many of its ever diminishing embassies.
CONCLUSION
The institutional form of the U.S. Government continues to
evolve in this decade as the United States continues to sort out
its grand strategic functions in a rapidly changing world. This
should come as no surprise. At the beginning of the Cold War, the
United States changed its definition of national security. But it
took a 10-year period encompassing an iterative public and
political process for containment to be elaborated and broadly
accepted.
America's concept of national security today is infinitely
more complex than at any time in its history. The same is true
for the relationship between the foreign and domestic components
of national security. And yet there is the continuity in an
increasingly interdependent world of the merging relationship
between these two components reminiscent of the early years of
the Republic when national security was conceived in terms of
both secure national borders and a stable federal union.
Currently, both the executive and legislative branches are
focused on those domestic problems most closely related to
America's international strength and competitiveness.
Nevertheless, political debate in a period of resource
constraints invariably turns to the purely domestic sources of
national greatness and, as a consequence, to economic and social
problems often primarily concerned with basic issues of equity.
The calculated relationship of means to ends is still the essence
of strategy at any level. The danger of an expanded concept of
national security in an era of competing means without an
overarching foreign threat and without fully integrated grand
strategies is a public perception of a zero sum relationship
between domestic and foreign affairs.
In such a milieu, the concomitant danger is that the U.S.
governmental institutions that evolved from the National Security
Act are perceived purely as an atavism of the Cold War. National
security is too important in a time of change to ignore the
balance of continuity. The two-tiered system of national security
organization and national military establishment embodied in the
National Security Act remains the basic structure. But the real
architects of that act, Ferdinand Eberstadt and James Forrestal,
realized that organizing for national security was a dynamic,
evolutionary process. They expected the national security state
to undergo continued adjustment and in fact were responsible for
the major 1949 reorganization. Such adjustments continue in the
wake of the Cold War within the positive yet adversarial dynamic
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of executive-legislative relations--a dynamic that created the
National Security Act. Although derived from the experiences of
World War II, the institutions created by the National Security
Act responded to the evolving lessons of the events that occurred
after that conflict. The same process is occurring in the postCold War era. There is no reason to expect that even as national
security functions are sorted out in the coming years, the
institutional baby will have to be thrown out with the Cold War
bath water. Formal institutional arrangements, as Alexander Pope
long ago pointed out, can adjust in a pragmatic, evolutionary
manner.
For forms of government let fools contest
What e'er is best administered is best
The Cold War was a long war that demonstrated the importance
of patience, perserverence, and endurance in the face of
protracted conflict without prospects of clear victory. It was,
however, also a long peace that demonstrated that tranquility,
certainty, and predictability are not necessarily synonymous with
the absence of major conflict. Certainly, government institutions
spawned by the Cold War will have to evolve in order to deal with
increasing domestic concerns, and in fact the process is already
underway. But the world is no less Hobbesian in nature than it
ever was. The barbarians can always be expected at the gate. Do
not confuse securite, the feeling of having nothing to fear, the
author of the Larousse Modern Dictionary warns in a different
context, and surete, the state of having nothing to fear.79
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CHAPTER 2
THE NEW MEANING OF SECURITY
Ronald Steel
The most troublesome concepts are the ones we take for
granted. This is not only because they are familiar, but because
they are imbedded in our way of thinking. They roll off our
tongues without our ever stopping to think what they really mean.
We come to take them as established truths, like Biblical
injunctions.
One of these concepts lies at the very heart of our thinking
about the outside world: the concept of "national security." It
is central to the apparatus of government, and enjoys the highest
priority over our resources and our lives. Yet, like many other
familiar terms, it is not a neutral description of an external
reality. It is a social construct. It came into being at a
specific time and in response to a specific set of circumstances.
Those circumstances governed the way we defined the term then,
and continue to define it now.
It was 50 years ago this summer that President Harry Truman
signed the National Security Act. The very terminology reflected
a new American approach to the world, and eventually itself
became the justification for that approach. The legislation
provided for a limited unification of the armed forces,
preserving the Army and Navy and establishing the Air Force as
separate departments. In response to enormous pressure from the
Navy and its supporters--including James Forrestal, then Navy
Secretary and later the first Secretary of Defense, and also Carl
Vinson and other influential legislators--the Navy retained its
air arm (which it saw as the engine of its future growth) and
successfully blocked full merger of the services and creation of
a general staff.
In addition to partial unification of the armed forces, the
act also established the National Security Council to coordinate
foreign policy operations, a National Security Resources Board,
and a Central Intelligence Agency. The Act reflected the
arguments favored by the Navy and Air Force, which sought the
lion's share of future budgets, and of the influential Eberstadt
Report that heralded the nation's "new international commitments"
and declared that these "have greatly enlarged the sphere of our
international obligations, reflecting present concepts of our
national security in terms of world security." The phrasing is
significant: "national security in terms of world security." No
definition is given, of course, as to what "world security" might
mean. It is presumably self-evident. Herein, then, lies an
indication of how the new concept of "national security" embraced
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and then went far beyond the traditional notion of "defense."
Indeed, it would have been appropriate to have had, instead of a
modestly entitled "Defense Department" (which replaced the plain
vanilla War Department), a "National Security Department."
Although the familiar phrase can be traced far back, it did
not enter the common vocabulary until after World War II. It was
first popularized by Walter Lippmann in his influential 1943
book, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic. There he wrote
that America's long insulation from European quarrels was not due
to any inherent virtue on our part, but a consequence of our
protection by two great oceans and a benevolent British Navy.
This fortuitous combination of circumstances had, he argued,
"diverted our attention from the idea of national security."
The phrase, and with it the entire concept, quickly caught
on. It captured the feeling of power and exuberance that followed
from the victory over Germany and Japan. It repudiated the
discredited refuge of isolationism, and it suggested a far
broader involvement of the United States in world affairs. In
arguing for policies based on what he called a hard calculation
of "national interest," Lippman also added a caveat. A workable
foreign policy, he maintained, "consists in bringing into
balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the
nation's commitments and the nation's power." This dictum later
came to be honored as much in the breach as in the observance.
What Lippmann inherently recognized, and what later became
abundantly clear, was how broadly the new concept of "national
security," could be construed. Unlike the term "defense," which
connotes repelling an invasive force, it suggests not just
resistance to aggression, but an outward reach to anticipate and
neutralize dangers that might still be only potential. It draws a
security perimeter that is determined, in practice, only by the
reach of national power. A regional power will have a regional
security perimeter, a global power will be satisfied with nothing
less than a global one. The perimeter expands to fill the amount
of power available. And the definition of security expands with
it.
For this reason, security gets unhinged from its
geographical moorings. It becomes a function of power and an
aspect of psychology. It becomes internalized. It is not a
specific reality, and it does not exist entirely in space. It is
a function of definition, and can be defined broadly or narrowly.
Small and weak states define security narrowly, large and
powerful ones define it broadly. Security, then, is a reflection
of a nation's (or at least of a nation's elite's) sense of its
power. It is a powerful operating mechanism, and at the same time
an abstraction.
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It is striking how quickly the American sense of security,
confirmed by the wartime victories and the development of the
ultimate weapon, the atomic bomb, developed into a sense of
insecurity. The postwar quarrels with the Soviet Union,
intensified by a communist ideology that was, in its aspirations
(or pretensions), global in sweep--as was, in its own way, the
American counterideology of democratic capitalism--gave way to a
pervasive sense of insecurity.
Virtually no place seemed to be really secure. Where there
were not Soviet legions, there were communist believers, or
sympathizers, enemies without and enemies within. Everything
seemed crucial, and everything was up for grabs. This new sense
of global security (and as its inseparable companion, global
insecurity) was enshrined in the Truman Doctrine of 1947.
Fifty years ago President Truman went before Congress to ask
for a relatively modest amount of money to assist the
anticommunist governments of Greece and Turkey. But what he got
came to be far more important than the contents. The packaging
was what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine. There, to
legislators who had little inkling of what these modest words
would soon justify, Truman declared that Americans must commit
themselves to aiding what he described as "free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside
pressures."
What few were asked at the time was how he defined "free
peoples", or whether "armed minorities" was not another way of
saying "civil war," or what he meant by "outside pressures." Just
what kind of situations was he suggesting that the United States
get into? Truman then went on to elaborate that "totalitarian
regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect
aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and
hence the security of the United States."
Again there was a little problem of vagueness. Which free
peoples, and how free must they be to qualify? What is "indirect
aggression" and how does the United States propose to counter it?
Furthermore, what is "international peace"? If taken at face
value, it means a beatific state of affairs that has probably
never existed. Most troublesome of all was the key word "hence"-as in "hence the security of the United States" is threatened by
the absence of international peace.
What Truman was saying was that threats to free (that is,
anticommunist) governments anywhere were security threats to the
United States. While presumably one was not supposed to take this
literally, what it was intended to do was to lay out a new
definition of international engagement, one global in scope and
without clear political or geographical definition. It was
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inevitable that it would collide head-on with the anxieties of a
public unpersuaded of its necessity. The excesses of globalism,
and the disaster that was Vietnam, was foretold in the exuberant
language of the Truman Doctrine.
If the first problem with the concept of "national security"
is expansiveness, the second is its vagueness. In its effort to
simplify and to win public support for a global level of
engagement, it often failed to distinguish between the vital and
the desirable, the critical and the peripheral. It suggested that
everything was vital and security a seamless web. But then some
things turned out not to be so vital after all, like South
Vietnam. Where does one draw the line? If it was not really
vital, then how about South Korea, or NATO? If security is to
some degree arbitrary, then are interests arbitrary as well?
An example of vagueness carried to its ultimate extreme as a
security doctrine can be found in a declaration by the current
administration's former National Security Advisor, that the
enemies of the United States, now that the Cold War is over,
include no less than "extreme nationalists and tribalists,
terrorists, organized criminals, coup plotters, rogue states, and
all those who would return newly free societies to the intolerant
ways of the past." Aside from the welcome news that intolerant
ways are now largely confined to the past, one wonders whether
there is anyone left, by this definition, who is not an enemy of
the United States.
The major reason for the intellectual confusion evidenced by
such statements lies, I would suggest, in the unmooring of the
concept of "national security" from the more explicit and narrow
concept of "defense." Defense is precise, national security is
diffuse; defense is a condition, national security is a feeling.
The doctrine of national security emphasizes the nation-state. It
came to prominence at a time when states were viewed not only as
the dominant, but as virtually the only action at the end of the
Cold War. There are two reasons for this. First, the state
enjoys, by definition, a monopoly on military power. The Cold
War, for all its ideological overlay, was primarily a contest
between powerful, militarized states. But as the end of the war
has decreased the relevance of military power, so has it reduced
the importance of the state.
A second reason for the decline of the state is the growing
importance of trade, production, and wealth as determinants of
power and influence. The central arena in which advanced
industrial societies compete has shifted dramatically from the
instruments of war to the instruments of wealth. In this new
competition, a former military superpower has become a
supplicant, and former puny protectorates such as Taiwan,
Singapore, and South Korea, not to mention Japan, have become
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powerful players. In the past the great trading states were, for
the most part, major military players as well: France, Germany,
Japan, Spain, even Venice. Today the economic giants are, for the
most part, content to remain militarily weak.
The governing theoretical model for international relations
during the Cold War--the "paradigm" in political science talk-was that of Realism, or power politics. The state was deemed to
be the paramount actor, its sovereignty an absolute, and its
protection the ultimate purpose of its military and diplomatic
forces. States, being considered independent actors, could be
threatened only by other states. Since states exist in a
Hobbesian world of international anarchy, they must protect
themselves from envious rivals. They must accrue military power
(or put themselves under the tutelage of a powerful protector).
That this may provoke anxieties among other states and make them
feel threatened is the self--fulfilling prophecy of the security
dilemma. Under these rules security is defined as the prevention
of war with other states, or victory in any conflict that occurs.
This is all very well, if the nation--state is the dominant
reality of public life, and if it has the ability to command
undiluted loyalty. But in parts of the world the state has
collapsed (as in Central Africa), or is an instrument of drug
lords and local oligarchies (as in parts of Latin America), or is
run by a single family or clan (as in much of the Middle East and
the Third World). In these cases it commands, not loyalty but
fear, and rules by intimidation. And instead of providing
security for its citizens, it actually threatens it.
In such a case, what allegiance is owed the state? The
question is not an abstract one. In recent years we have seen the
disintegration of established states, such as Yugoslavia and the
Soviet Union, and the hollowing-out of others that exist only at
the convenience of outside forces that sustain their ruling
regimes, as in the former African colonies of France. Even in
parts of the industrialized world, the state is sometimes
incapable of providing security for some of its citizens. One has
only to look to the slums of our major cities for confirmation of
this sorry fact--or even to affluent areas, with their guarded
gates and private police forces, for confirmation.
The problem is not simply that the state is often unable to
provide security, which is, after all, the major justification
for its existence. It has also become increasingly secondary,
even superfluous, to the economic life of peoples everywhere. The
export and import of capital, the shifting of hundreds of
billions of dollars around the world each day, the decisions over
investment and employment, wages and production--all these are
made primarily by private forces under little or no state
control. Within the economic realm, we are approaching the
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condition described by Karl Marx (albeit under different
circumstances) where the state is withering away.
No longer can any single state make decisions impervious to
market forces and market commands: not unless it wants to commit
economic suicide. States, like Gulliver, are confined by an everwidening web of agreements, regulations, and prohibitions that
lay outside their control. The U.S. Government, for example, has
learned that it cannot enforce against its own European allies,
and Canada, its self-declared embargo against Cuba--not even when
it declares the matter to be one vital to its "national
security"--which it has recently done. If national security now
means that store clerks from Toronto and housewives from Cologne
must not be allowed to sun themselves on Cuban beaches, then Karl
Marx has once again been proven right in observing that events
appear in history the first time as tragedy, and the second time
as farce.
What is taking place on every level--in the economy,
communications, environment, and health--is the decline of the
state as an autonomous actor. It will continue to exist for a
long time, but shorn of its former pretense and majesty: a victim
of forces it cannot control. Increasingly, the greatest threats
to the well-being of citizens come not from other states, not
from independent actors, but from conditions: immigration,
environmental degradation, individual and group terrorism,
economic exploitation.
How does the so-called Realist paradigm--which declares
states to be the dominant force of international life and the
unhindered pursuit of their self-defined "interests" to be the
duty of their citizens--help us to deal with this reality? What,
indeed, are we to make of the concept of "statecraft" when the
state itself is only one of the actors, or forces, that
influences our lives? And beyond that, what happens to the
concept of the majestic state when its role is reduced to that of
a facilitator of private transactions?
Consider the international trade organizations that have
become so important in the past few years: the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO). These entities are really little more than giant trade
groups whose purpose is to increase the flow of commerce. They do
this by eliminating government regulations and ignoring
international frontiers. Their purpose is to make national
governments irrelevant. What is novel about them, and a telling
mark of their power, is that they have enlisted governments to do
this work for them. Governments are being reduced to the role of
traffic cops, ensuring that everyone follows the regulations that
are, of course, written by and for the most powerful
corporations.
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In some places this process has gone so far that the state
can hardly be said to exist at all. By this I do not mean such
narco-states as Colombia, Mexico, Burma, and Pakistan, where drug
lords rule independent fiefdoms. Rather I have in mind Russia,
where the new giant corporate entities (themselves former state
enterprises stolen from the people by their former managers and
the new Mafia entrepreneurs) control the government and refuse to
pay taxes to a state that they consider, quite understandably,
the servant of their ambition. In effect, the role of such a
state is to keep the population in line, deflect criticism of
commercial operations by engaging in military diversions, such as
the war in Chechnya, and keep out competitors.
Russia may be an extreme example, but not a unique one. The
same phenomenon can be seen, to one degree or another, throughout
the industrialized world. What this means is that national
security, as traditionally conceived, has lost its meaning. There
is military security, which is designed to protect the nationstate against other nation-states. This will obviously remain
important, just as police forces remain important within cities.
But there is another realm for which it is largely irrelevant:
the realm of interests that is impervious to borders. Here the
tools are far more subtle and complex, and the nation with the
biggest military force may well not be best equipped to preserve
these interests.
In this sense, national interest is an important interest,
but not the only one. Other interests claim the loyalty of
individuals; people do not define themselves only as citizens. In
recent years, we have had reason to become aware of cultural
sources of identity. Modern Islam furnishes a dramatic, but not
unique, example of identities that transcend, and even seek to
eradicate, frontiers. We have been told that the conflicts of the
post-Cold War world will be of a different nature than those of
the past: that the clash of states will give way to the clash of
civilizations. Although we need not adopt the apocalyptic
conclusions of that analysis, it is clear that states are not
always the ultimate objects of loyalty, that societies can be
riven from within by individuals whose deeply held social values
make their own state itself the enemy. We may think of Algiers,
but we need look no farther than Oklahoma City for a
demonstration of this.
Societies today are being torn apart; not only between
civilizations or religions, as in the Bosnian War, but also
within them. There is a deadly struggle between traditionalists
and modernists, between those who have embraced technological and
social change and those who fear and resist it. The fault-lines
of future, and even present, wars lie not only between
civilizations, but within them. In this struggle the state is, at
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best, irrelevant, where it is not actually considered to be the
enemy.
Whether or not war is, as Joseph Schumpeter has written, the
health of the state, it is the way by which the state demands its
citizens' loyalties and affirms its own primacy. It justifies
this by the claim that it is the ultimate, and most reliable,
guarantor of its citizens' welfare. Yet there has been an
increasing tendency to question the central premise of raison
d'etat.
The U.S. Senate came very close to rejecting President
Bush's call for war against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait. The
expeditionary force in Somalia had to be pulled out when it
encountered casualties, and the intervention in Bosnia was
delayed for several years until it became clear that American
troops would not likely be drawn into the fighting. Even today it
is unlikely that the President would be able to keep our forces
there if the intercommunal war resumed. Only in the case of Haiti
was there support for military intervention, and that was because
there was a serious national interest at stake: keeping unwanted
refugees out of the United States. The American people will
apparently not presently support direct participation in other
people's civil wars: not even where considerations of "national
security" are claimed.
If wars are harder to justify, it may also be that, at least
for the foreseeable future, they are less likely to occur. There
have been no wars between major powers for more than 50 years. If
the United States and the Soviet Union, for a variety of good
reasons, did not choose to fight each other, what major states
can we now imagine doing so--and for what stakes? What possible
victory is worth the cost? And what society, democratic or not,
would be willing to pay it?
While I would not go so far as to argue that nuclear
proliferation is a good thing because it tempers hotheads who
might otherwise go to war, the fact is that nuclear weapons have
probably saved Israel and dissuaded India and Pakistan from open
war. They are also likely to restrain China in its pursuit of
great power status, and also other states that contest its right
to do so.
There are other reasons why war among major states may be
less likely in the future. One is that industrial societies,
under the pressures of economic competition and innovation, are
perforce becoming more democratic. Democratic states, while not
necessarily peace-prone, appear less likely to fight other
democratic states than do authoritarian ones. A further, and to
my mind more compelling, reason is that the great trading states-those with the capacity to fight major wars--have become far
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more interdependent than in the past. This is one beneficial
result of the global economy. With these economic links come a
whole chain of other dependencies, all of which make war more
self-defeating than in the past.
If the danger of a major war has diminished, at least as far
as the great powers are concerned, what kind of traditional
security threats does the United States face. By "traditional," I
mean threats from another state. The fact of the matter is that
insofar as we can envisage the future--there is no one out there
capable of causing the United States serious harm. Russia is a
deeply--wounded state that was always weaker than we believed and
that will take decades to recover even a semblance of its former
power. For a long time it will remain the sick man on the fringes
of Europe: a problem but not a threat. Japan is a mercantalist,
pacifist society, single-mindedly obsessed with enriching itself
as in the 1930s. It has no higher ambition than to be America's
number one creditor, number one supplier, number one investor,
and number one protectorate.
And what of Europe, the potential superpower: more populous,
richer, more experienced in the evil ways of the world than the
United States? Will it one day be a serious rival? Not likely.
Europe--if by that term we mean a political entity equipped and
willing to make independent foreign policy decisions involving
issues of war and peace--does not exist. Nor, despite the hopes
and pretensions of Brussels bureaucrats, is it likely to come
into being. In fact, the movement is quite the other way--away
from visions of a European superstate capable of challenging, or
even being an equal partner with, the United States. Even the
effort to create a common currency--let alone a common defense
and foreign policy--has proven to be so costly and contentious
that it would be surprising if it happens at all. The Eurocrats
were overly ambitious and their American well-wishers overly
optimistic.
Which leaves China. Traditionally Americans have had a
paternalistic attitude toward China, an exploited nation that we
felt would, with proper guidance, follow our leadership to the
promised land of capitalism and Christianity. Then the Chinese
rudely betrayed our hopes, and the smiling little brother became
his Doppelganger, the Yellow Peril. Now we don't know how to
think about China--as a limitless market or an unending problem.
With its immense population and bourgeoning economy, China
is, to be sure, a potential great power. But it also has immense
problems of governance, of national unity, and of political
legitimacy. The world has come to enjoy low-cost Chinese exports;
but it can do without them. China, however, if it is to prosper,
needs strong economic and political ties with the rest of the
world. The government has tied its legitimacy to its ability to
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provide a rising standard of living for the Chinese people. It
cannot do that through a path of aggression. China must be
engaged, not confronted. To treat it as a national security
threat will contribute to making it one.
If the danger of major war has decreased, what do we mean
when we speak of security threats? How will we recognize them
when they do not entail the survival of the nation, or even its
well-being? Just as the so-called "other side" has disappeared
with the end of the Cold War, so has the old meaning of the word
"threat." What once seemed clear is now vague, ambiguous,
diffuse, and unpredictable, both in its source and its impact.
Policymakers draw up a long list of potential security
threats. That is one of the things they are paid to do. These
range from the emergence of another evil empire at one extreme,
to "coup plotters and tribalists" at another. But if we get
serious, it is striking how few threats from another state the
United States today faces.
For all practical purposes, the country is invulnerable. It
cannot be invaded. It has no enemy interested in destroying it
that has the capacity to do so. It is not dependent on foreign
trade, even though parts of the economy benefit from it. It feeds
itself. It enjoys allies, but has no compelling need for them-and in fact never relied on them for defense during the Cold War.
The United States spread its net of protection, and foreign
bases, very wide, but not in self-defense. Because of its
economic and military strength, its physical resources, its loyal
population, and its privileged geographical position, the United
States can afford to ignore a good deal of the turbulence in much
of the rest of the world.
There are other reasons why we should involve ourselves with
other nations, but defense, or national security, is not a
compelling one. That is why it is striking that the class of
specialists we call "national security managers" has set out for
itself the task of global management. This can be seen in a
number of policy pronouncements, strategy scenarios, and Pentagon
wish-lists, but perhaps nowhere more dramatically than in a 1992
Defense Department document that argued that the United States
must "discourage the advanced industrial nations from challenging
our leadership or even aspiring to a larger regional or global
role."
When word of this ambition got around, the document was
quickly toned down. But it was an accurate reflection of an
attitude that is common in Washington policymaking circles today.
It came out of the quick fix of the Gulf War, but even more from
the way the Cold War ended--with not only the retreat of the
Soviet Union, but its collapse and disintegration. Because this
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left only one great power, it gave birth, not surprisingly, to
the notion of a unipolar world led by the United States and
dedicated to the promulgation of American values. It was General
Patton speaking through the mouth of Woodrow Wilson.
It is sold to the American public in the name of "security"
(because the public is not particularly interested in running the
world, even for the world's own good), and justified to other
nations by claiming that it is good for them too. It obviates the
need for them to develop powerful armed forces of their own,
since we pledge to defend their best interests. This is a curious
notion, and it is not surprising that it has not been greeted
with universal acceptance.
The ones most favorable are the Europeans and Japanese, who
see this as a way of avoiding the cost of their own defense. This
does not, of course, prevent them from challenging the United
States on economic issues, which are the kinds that concern them
most deeply. They are content to let us defend them so long as it
does not get in the way of more important things. Thus, too, the
expansion of NATO, which they agree to because Washington wants
it, and because it spares the West Europeans the costly
alternative of allowing the East Europeans into their privileged
economic club.
This leadership strategy is an expensive one. NATO expansion
alone is scheduled to cost some $100 billion for upgrading of
East European armed forces. No wonder Wall Street likes it. And
we continue to spend militarily at Cold War levels. Currently it
costs about $100 billion a year to "reassure" the Europeans
(though against what is unspecified), and another $45 billion or
so for the Japanese and Koreans. Today more than 50 percent of
all discretionary federal spending is still devoted to national
security, even in the absence of an enemy. While other nations
invest for production, the United States borrows for consumption-and in the process becomes further indebted to the trade rivals
whose interests it seeks to protect.
There is much the United States can and should do in the
world, particularly in the economic and humanitarian realm. But
this cannot be done while we try to maintain a pretense of global
primacy that rests on a diminishing leverage in the military and
diplomatic realm. It is time to balance our foreign policy as
well as our budget: to bring into line, in Lippmann's useful
phrase, resources with commitments, and to take a serious look at
other demands on those resources. The American people want the
nation to be strong and to stick by its ideals. But they are not
interested in grandiose plans of global management.
Americans are not by nature or by inclination imperialists.
We are a strong and resilient society that is burdened with
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serious social needs that require urgent attention. Some of these
problems not only prevent us from competing more effectively in
the international arena, but also threaten the well-being and
safety--that is, the security--of Americans. A national security
policy that does not take that into account is inadequate,
unrealistic, and unworthy. It also is doomed to fail.
Our primary foreign policy interests are critical, but few.
They are to protect the American homeland from destruction and to
preserve our institutions and form of government. Beyond this, we
have a secondary interest in the expansion of the market economic
core that contributes to our prosperity, in access to natural
resources, in the protection of our common environment, and in
peaceful processes of change in areas to which we are intimately
linked culturally and politically. Finally, at a tertiary level,
we seek to promote democracy not because this contributes to our
security in any tangible sense, but because it reflects our
values.
This is a big list for a country with only 4 percent of the
world's population and a steadily declining proportion of its
wealth and production. If we are not to exhaust ourselves in
pursuit of grandiose ambitions, we must reestablish a sense of
the feasible. This is the kind of Realism of which we are most in
need. Specifically, we should abandon the pretense of global
military control, turn over regional security tasks to the major
powers of those regions, end our high-cost and high-risk
dependency on Persian Gulf oil, focus on global competitiveness
as the prime objective of our military posture, transform our
role from that of global enforcer to that of conciliator and
balancer, and address far more seriously the other kind of
national security: the threats to the well-being of people that
lie beyond the competition among states.
Security is, after all, not a condition, but a feeling and a
process. It is also an abstraction. We may feel secure and not be
so, and be secure and not feel so. We are all vulnerable in ways
we cannot imagine and cannot fully protect ourselves against.
That is our human condition. So therefore let us not seek
absolutes, but instead measure. And let us put security in its
proper place, which is a means to a greater end, but not an end
in itself. In a real sense it is true, in the words of Macbeth,
that "Security is mortals' chiefest enemy."
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CHAPTER 3
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE:
THE FIRST HALF CENTURY
Lawrence Korb
The Department of Defense (DoD) is an organization that has
been for the past 50 years--and I'm sure for the next 50 years-criticized for doing too much and too little, for not being
centralized enough, for being over centralized, and so on and so
forth. The reasons for those criticisms are that when we set up
the DoD about 50 years ago, the country tried to balance
conflicting and sometimes contradictory objectives. First, we
wanted to insure civilian control, but at the same time we wanted
to respect military professionalism and allow the military a way
to get their opinions and expertise into the policy process.
Second, while the President is the Commander-in-Chief, the
Congress has the power to declare war, to set personnel policies,
and to give the President the money that he needs to serve as
Commander-in-Chief. Third, many political leaders wanted a
unified and very efficient DoD, but the separate services wanted
to preserve their independence.
Throughout the last 50 years, analysts have complained about
all the fraud, waste, and abuse in the DoD and asked whether it
couldn't be better managed. Why couldn't DoD be like General
Motors or Ford or any of the great American supposedly efficient
corporations? But others wanted to ensure that decisionmakers
would have a diversity of opinions. They wanted to ensure that
Congress, the American people, and the President heard many
points of view. The authors of the 1947 Act wanted the military
to act, plan, and budget jointly, but they didn't want a German
general staff or a "man on horseback." They wanted the military
to be strong and united but not too strong or too united. The
authors wanted this nation to have for the first time in its
history a large standing, professional, peacetime military, while
ensuring that this professional military maintained its
connection to society and to democratic values.
It is not surprising, given these conflicting objectives,
that over the past 50 years the National Security Act of 1947--as
it relates to the DoD--has been amended six times. There were
four major changes and two comparatively minor changes. In the
first decade alone, there were three major reorganizations of the
DoD. Another change took place in the 1960s and one in the 1970s.
The most recent, and probably the most profound, attempt at
reform was The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of
1986. If you analyze the organizational history of the DoD, you
have to look at the first 40 years and then look at the last 10,
because the change in 1986 was very, very profound, not only for
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the DoD but for the American political system. So, as I analyze
how we have dealt with these conflicting objectives, I am going
to look first at the period from 1947 to roughly the mid-1980s
and then discuss the last decade.
Let me speak about the first objective the 1947 Act was
trying to achieve--civilian control of the military. Civilian
control within the executive branch is carried out by three
officials and their staffs--the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and the secretaries of the individual services (the
Secretary of the Army, Navy, or Air Force). Those of you that are
students of public administration know that the DoD is the only
department that has departments within it: the Department of the
Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air
Force. The secretaries of those departments also have the rank of
secretary just like their boss, the Secretary of Defense. Let me
turn first to the Secretary of Defense who really becomes the key
individual within the executive branch in maintaining civilian
control. The authors of the National Security Act of 1947
recognized, and I think quite properly, that we were going to
have a large military and that we were going to be involved in
world affairs, because the National Security Act was passed after
the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan had already been
promulgated. They also knew that the President would be too busy
to spend all his time worrying about the DoD and national
security, and so they created the position of Secretary of
Defense. This is a very powerful position and, I would argue, the
most difficult of all cabinet positions.
Last June I was in New York at a meeting of the Council on
Foreign Relations, and I wanted to get back to Washington that
night because I had business there the next day. When I arrived
at the airport, however, I discovered that the last shuttle to DC
had been canceled due to bad weather. Trying to think what to do,
I looked out of the corner of my eye and saw Ambassador Jeanne
Kirkpatrick also waiting for the last shuttle. We ended up
renting a car. On the way back, she asked me about the position
of Secretary of Defense, since candidate Dole had mentioned
offering it to her. I said I don't think you want this job,
because you want to get involved in policy and have very strong
positions. The Secretary of Defense is involved in policy but the
Secretary of Defense also has one of the largest managerial, if
not the largest managerial, job in the world. Secretaries of
Defense deal every day with problems that can distract them from
policymaking. The position is very different from the Secretary
of State. The foreign service is a comparatively small
organization. It doesn't have the millions of people who work for
the DoD.
I was reminded of this conversation when Bill Cohen, the new
Secretary of Defense, held his first press conference. CNN asked
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me if I would come to the studio and comment on it. I said there
is not going to be much to comment on. They said, "Why?" I said
because all he is going to be asked about is blood pinning. You
may remember this if you saw those videos where the Marines were
mashing the paratroopers wings into the chests of their
colleagues. They said, "Oh no, no, no, he said he is going to
talk about Bosnia." I said, "Well he can say he is going to talk
about anything he wants, but the press is going to ask him about
blood pinning." Sure enough, he spent all of his time talking
about blood pinning. That is what happens when you are the
Secretary of Defense. You cannot say, look I am only going to
focus on Bosnia today, if something like Aberdeen or blood
pinning is going on and, given the large number of people and
places where DOD employees are stationed, inevitably there is
something like that going on.
So the job of Secretary of Defense can be frustrating, but
it is also very challenging and powerful. The Secretary of
Defense is essentially the deputy commander-in-chief. This is a
very different role than the one envisioned by Congress in 1947.
Since they were concerned about preserving their access to a
diversity of opinion, Congress gave us a very weak Secretary of
Defense, who was allowed to have only three assistant secretaries
and no more than 50 people to help him do his job. We soon found
out that that was not enough, and today the Secretary of Defense
has something like 15 assistant and under secretaries. Over the
years, this has enabled the secretary to become more and more
powerful. Interestingly enough, just as a side note, in 1947 it
was not even called the DoD--it was called the National Military
Establishment. It was not till 1949 that it became a DoD and that
the Secretary of Defense began to acquire the power that he
needed. In 1953 and in 1958, the power of the Secretary of
Defense vis-a-vis the individual military departments or armed
services was further increased through new legislation. The
person driving this was General/President Eisenhower because he
felt that the 1947 Act was too weak in terms of the power that it
gave to the Secretary of Defense. So, when he became President,
he pushed for an increase in the power.
The power of the Secretary of Defense reached its zenith in
the 1960s--not through any legislation but through the person of
Robert McNamara, who had come to the Pentagon from the Ford Motor
Company. He studied the 1947 Act and the 1949, 1953, and 1958
Amendments, and concluded he did not need any more formal
legislation in order to exercise the powers of the office. In
fact, Senator Henry Jackson and President Kennedy wanted to enact
new legislation when McNamara took office, but he said he did not
need it and that, in fact, he could run the place with the powers
that he had. And run it he did; for better or for worse. (I will
comment on that a little bit later.) What McNamara did in order
to get control of the Pentagon was to adopt a methodology called
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the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). PPBS
leveled the playing field for the Secretary vis-a-vis the
military because, on the basis of this analysis, decisions were
made which did not have to rely just on military experience. Now,
the Secretary had an analytical framework that he could use to
make decisions.
Ever since McNamara's time in the Pentagon, the secretaries
of Defense have basically used their decisionmaking tools and the
framework that he established, and have been as powerful really
as they have wanted to be. Some of the secretaries that followed
McNamara felt that he overcentralized and did not allow the
military legitimate input into the process. Some of them
decentralized the system, but they still used his particular
framework, and it was really up to the individual secretary to
decide how strong he wanted to be in running the department.
Until 1986 the Secretary and his office had no real rival,
because power had been taken from the individual services. Until
1986 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were very unorganized and
preoccupied with inter-service battles. Thus, they did not speak
with a common voice. After 1986, a rival power center to the
Secretary of Defense emerged in terms of running the department,
i.e., the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The service secretaries have been the big losers over the
past 50 years. In fact, service secretaries are much like college
presidents. They are supposed to raise money for the individual
armed services and then stay out of the way, and the Secretary of
Defense and his office set the policy. I once interviewed the
Secretary of the Army and asked him, "What do you do when you get
the budget?" He said, "I give it three cheers, and I send it on
its way up to the Secretary of Defense." Service secretaries
basically get the dirty work. When there are problems, like
Aberdeen or Tailhook, send the service secretaries. They are the
people who have to take the heat. Astute secretaries of defense
have allowed them to do that, so that they can reserve not only
their time but their political capital for other issues. I once
asked David Packard, who was a Deputy Secretary of Defense, how
he got along with his service secretaries. He said, "Well, I call
them in once a week, and I tell them what to do." Now, there have
been exceptions. Paul Nitze was a powerful Secretary of the Navy
because of the background that he brought to the job. John Lehman
was also a powerful Secretary of the Navy because of the
decisionmaking style of my boss, Secretary Weinberger, as well as
the political connections that he had on the Hill and in the
White House (where his brother worked in the National Security
Council). But these were exceptions.
Before I leave the executive branch, let me say a few words
about the Presidents. Presidents have been involved in dealing
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with the DoD issues, but only by exception. They basically get
involved in a few issues that become important to the nation. For
example, President Truman in 1948 desegregated the armed forces
over the opposition of the Secretary of Defense as well as the
service secretaries. President Eisenhower was very concerned
about the whole nuclear strategy and got very much involved in
the strategy we called massive retaliation. President Johnson got
involved in the anti-ballistic missile decision because it had
become a political issue throughout the country. Richard Nixon
was the one behind creating the all volunteer force. This was not
something that the Secretary of Defense, the service secretaries
or the military wanted. Ronald Reagan, as you know, got involved
in Strategic Defense Initiatives (SDI). President Clinton has
gotten involved in debates about weapons like the B-2, the tilt
rotor osprey, and, of course, an issue that took up a lot of time
in his first months in office, gays in the military.
Let me move to the legislative branch and discuss how it has
exercised its power over the past 50 years. Within the Congress,
the two major committees in each chamber that deal with the armed
forces are the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House
National Security Committee. Then within the House Appropriations
Committee (remember Congress only has one Appropriations
Committee), you have defense subcommittees. These committees have
been very much involved. But their influence has been marginal.
They do add or subtract certain programs. They like to earmark
money for particular projects, especially those that please the
folks back home. They have gotten involved in certain issues. For
example, missiles have been an issue they have been involved in.
It was Congress, during the Eisenhower years, that raised the
whole issue of the missile gap; the B-2 and the B-70 bombers were
issues that they got involved in because of the tremendous
employment impacts of those programs. Right now, some members of
Congress, particularly Republicans, want to have a national
missile defense.
By and large, however, Congress has just pretty well taken
what the executive has sent up in terms of the budget and made a
few changes--a few more airplanes, a few less airplanes, but
their influence has not been profound. The armed services
committees and the Appropriations Committee have seen their own
power decline with the rise of the budget committees. Floyd
Spence, the Chairman of the House National Security Committee,
said that he did not know what to do because the budget committee
had not yet told him how much to spend on defense and, until he
gets that decision, he cannot decide how to parcel it out among
his subcommittees. Today you find the budget committees holding
hearings on major weapons systems, not just on the total size of
the defense budget.
Congress, on occasion, has gotten involved in some other
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areas as well. For example, they have been involved in
promotions. They do have the power of promotions, but they very
rarely exercise it. However, they did step in and use this power
during Tailhook, when they felt that the Navy did not do an
adequate job at punishing those who were involved in that rather
sordid episode. They have also been concerned about organization
at the DoD. They insisted that certain assistant secretary jobs
be earmarked, because they are interested in them--e.g., health
and reserve affairs. Congress also pushed for the reinvigoration
of the special forces in the 1980s. In fact, the person
responsible for this was then Senator Cohen who is now Secretary
Cohen. I wonder how he will like it when folks over in Congress
tell him how to run the department. Congress has also gotten
involved in some personnel issues. President Truman was one who
pushed the integration of African-Americans into the armed
forces. However, it was Congress who took the lead in opening up
opportunities for women in the military, allowing them not only
to increase their numbers but to get into everything but ground
combat. Then, of course, Congress did not support President
Clinton's position on gays in the military.
This year Congress has decided that they do not even trust
the Pentagon--civilians or military--to formulate our defense
strategy for the new era. The Congress has appointed an outside
panel (The National Defense Panel) to review the work of the
Pentagon before they, the Congress, have to act on it. They have
put a lot of retired military people on the panel because they
feel that retired military people can be more open and honest
than those who are serving.
Let me move now to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have been
the major military actors over the past 50 years in this
organizational history. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were included
in the National Security Act of 1947 because there was a feeling
that they had performed very well in World War II. Actually, it
was a very loose arrangement. The British showed up at the
beginning of World War II and said, "Here are our Combined
Chiefs, we would like to meet with your group. We did not have
one. We had a Department of War. We had a Department of Navy.
There was a heated discussion about who should come and who
should be invited. For example, the commanding general of the
Army Air Corps was included because there was no separate Air
Force at the time. We won the war; therefore, everybody thought
the Joint Chiefs of Staff was a great organization, and that we
ought to continue it. In fact, Harry Truman, who was no great
lover of the military, once remarked, "If the Confederates had an
organization like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they would have won
the Civil War." Well, as it turned out the Joint Chiefs of Staff
organization really did not have a great impact on World War II.
Basically they let the Army and the Army Air Corps fight the war
in Europe and the Navy fight in the Pacific. General MacArthur
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had to be taken care of separately. But there was no great
unanimity and not much strategic thinking going on.
The creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not a
controversial part of the National Security Act, however. When it
was set up at first, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not even have
a chairman. The authors of the 1947 Act thought that the Service
Chiefs could work with the Secretary of Defense in much the same
way that the Secretary of War (now called the Secretary of the
Army) and the Secretary of the Navy had worked with their
military people. But, it did not work very well. For example,
James Forrestal, who was the first Secretary of Defense, went
over to see President Truman to find out how much he was going to
get for the budget. Truman said you can have $16 billion. So he
went back to the Pentagon, called the three chiefs in and he
said, "Ok, we got $16 billion, you guys tell me how to divide it
up." In the meeting, the Army said we need all 16; the Navy said
we need all 16; and the Air Force stated that they needed all 16.
And all three said we are not going to make any reductions. So,
Forrestal, with his three assistant secretaries and 50 people,
had to make those decisions. This is why, in 1949, we gave the
Joint Chiefs of Staff a chairman. But again, because of concern
about the danger of a man on horseback and over centralization,
he was not given a vote (and did not get a vote until 1958).
What really hamstrung the Chairman, until 1986, was that he
did not have a staff. The Joint Staff is currently a group of
1600 people (mainly military) who are assigned to work for this
organization called the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Until 1986, they
worked for the whole Joint Chiefs of Staff, rather than for the
Chairman. The Chairman did not have a deputy, nor did he have the
power to hire and fire anybody. When the Chairman was out of
town, one of the other Chiefs took over and, of course, since
there was a lot of disagreement with the Chairman, not many
things would happen while the boss was out of town. But in 1986,
we created a more powerful Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
gave him power over the Joint Staff and, basically, transformed
the service chiefs from a corporate advisory body to the
Secretary of Defense and the President into advisors to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Until 1986, it was
humorous when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would
come to a meeting with the Secretary of Defense or a meeting of
the National Security Council because he could not speak for
himself. The President would ask, "General, what do you think
about this?" And the Chairman would give the opinion of the
Chiefs. The President would ask again, "But what do you think?"
The Chairman would either repeat the Chiefs' view or give his own
view, and also give the other side of the argument. In effect,
his influence was minimal because of the way the law was written
until 1986.
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Before Nichols-Goldwater, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not
terribly important. In the 1950s they could not agree on a
strategy. In the 1960s, to combat the power of McNamara and his
predecessors, there was a lot of logrolling or least common
denominator positions. It really is not until the late 1980s and
this decade that we see a powerful Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff who becomes a major player.
Most of the discussion up until now has been about
peacetime. But remember, the DoD also has to fight wars. This
creates tension because, if you have an organization that works
well in peace, it is not certain that this same organization is
going to be able to work well in war. In fact, from an
organizational point of view, in all of the uses of military
force up until the Persian Gulf War, there were problems because
of the way in which the DoD was organized. During the Korean War,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff basically were supposed to directly
supervise the field commander, but they failed to rein in General
MacArthur, even though he disobeyed thier orders. They told him
not to advance toward the Yalu. MacArthur disobeyed, and, from a
military point of view, it was very foolish of him to go charging
up toward the Yalu and expose his forces to counterattack by the
Chinese. Unfortunately, the Secretary of Defense, who happened to
be George Marshall at the time, did not rein him in either. Nor
did the President.
In Vietnam, aside from the terrible, terrible, tragedy of
the war, the way it was fought and what our leaders told us about
it, from an organizational point of view, it was also a disaster.
The war was run by an admiral in Hawaii, who was called the
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, even though it was actually
being fought in Vietnam. General Westmoreland and his successor,
General Abrams, were called the "Military Assistance Commanders"
in Vietnam. In his book General Westmoreland says that down in
the delta in the southern part of South Vietnam, he did not have
enough air power to protect the troops because the Air Force was
off bombing in Thailand or Laos. But up in the north of South
Vietnam, the Marines had more planes than they needed to support
their ground troops. So wouldn't it have been good if he could
have moved some of those Marine planes from the north to the
south? As a field commander, you would think he would have had
that prerogative. But not under the system we had. The Marines
said, "No, we are not going. It is our job, we take care of our
own." So Westmoreland had to go back to Hawaii, and the issue
eventually was referred back to Washington for a vote. From an
organizational point of view, it made a bad situation worse.
In Desert I in 1979, the U.S. military was tasked with
trying to rescue the poor hostages who were being held captive in
Iran. The concept was that we should move Navy carriers off the
coast, and helicopters would fly off these carriers over land
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into Iran and rescue the hostages. The people most experienced in
flying helicopters long distances over land are Army and Air
Force pilots. But the Navy said they did not want any Army or Air
Force pilots on "their" carriers, so, as a compromise, they
agreed to let Marines fly the helicopters. Of course, it took the
Marines a while to train. Then, when the operation was finally
launched, we needed to get helicopters through to rescue the
hostages. We sent eight, and three of them did not make it: one
because of a storm that came up, and the plane turned back
because the person did not have the experience to fly through the
storm, and two others because of mechanical problems. The
operation had to be aborted. Likewise, in Lebanon in 1983, we
never fixed responsibility for failures in force protection
because the chain of command went from Lebanon to a general in
Europe and then back to Washington.
During the Grenada invasion of 1983, a less serious but
disturbing incident occurred. But it was the type of incident on
which Congress had to take action. When we went into Grenada, the
Army was pinned down. So a soldier got on his radio to call the
Navy to send in gunfire support. There was only one problem. The
Navy had different frequencies than the Army because, when they
acquired the communications equipment, they felt they would be
operating independ- ently. So being a bright young person, he
noticed a pay phone. He went over there, got on the phone and
used his credit card to call back to Washington and said, "Hey,
can you get a hold of the Navy for me, because I can't seem to
raise them?" Senator Nunn says that this is a true story; other
people deny it. But the fact of the matter is that there was
enough substance to it that it got people to want to take action.
The result was that in 1986 Congress did something that Congress
has rarely ever done, and that is give up some of their ability
to influence policy. They created a powerful chairman even though
it meant that, as a result, they were only going to hear one
military view from the DoD because this chairman would have a
tremendous amount of power and be able to dominate that
department. Colin Powell came along and did just that. General
Powell was to the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff what
Henry Kissinger was to the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. He defined that position in a way that
nobody else has, and exercised the power inherent in that
position to really dominate the process.
Let me conclude by talking about how the 1947 Act has
worked. I think it has served the country reasonably well, given
all of those conflicting objectives that I mentioned earlier.
True, it has broken down on occasion, but each time that it has
broken down, we fixed it. When the Secretary of Defense did not
have enough people to do his job, we gave him more people and
more power. When it was clear that under this system, a group of
co-equal military people was not running wars very well, Congress
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even gave up some of their own power. Likewise, there is no doubt
about the fact that McNamara cut the military out. But his
successors have allowed the military more participation and, with
the creation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you
now have a counterpart to the Secretary of Defense to ensure that
that military point of view gets into the policy process.
Many times students of administration focus a great deal on
organization and who has certain powers, and certainly that is
important. But if you take a look at the history of the DoD, you
notice that personalities count a lot. Robert McNamara dominated
the DoD during the time that he was there--even to the extent,
during the war in Vietnam, of imposing his systems analysis
methodology on the operation of the war. And you could have
another McNamara. You could have a man or woman walk in there and
really run the place, and by the time you found out about it, it
would be a little bit late. The situation with the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff is similar. Colin Powell has showed
that a chairman can really dominate the process. Not only did
Powell have a lot to do with the way the Gulf War was fought, but
he had a tremendous influence in the policy process. In fact,
many of my colleagues in the academic community have argued that
he went too far. For example, on the issue of the gays in the
military, it was clear what President Clinton wanted to do. He
had made dropping the ban a campaign promise. But Powell
basically led the opposition to it. Even before Clinton was sworn
in, during the transition, Powell was out drumming up support for
his own position, on television. The President wanted to go to
Bosnia. Powell didn't want to. He wrote an op-ed article saying
we have no business going to Bosnia. Many people have felt that
in doing this, he may have overstepped the bounds of civilian
control.
As we look towards the future, that is the thing we need to
worry about because, organizationally, I think, we have probably
gone about as far as we can. We can tinker with the organization-a little bit here and there--but those conflicts that I talked
about have more or less been decided. The key thing is the
individuals whom we appoint. I think Presidents need to be very
careful about whom they appoint as Secretary of Defense and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And Congress needs to hold
hearings on those appointments and really ensure that those men
and women understand the system that they will be involved in and
have the vision to balance all the conflicting imperatives within
it.
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CHAPTER 4
WHAT SHOULD THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1998 LOOK LIKE?
Morton H. Halperin
Congress created the National Security Act 50 years ago. It
was one of the many quite extraordinary accomplishments of that
period, including the "Marshall Plan" speech by General Marshall
at Harvard and the creation of NATO.
Now we are in a period in which the international situation
has changed as dramatically as it changed 50 years ago. This has
led people to think that we ought to reconsider the structures
that were created then and to ask whether they are still the
right institutions to deal with this new set of problems. There
has been a modest effort to have the government look at this
question. There was an intelligence commission that was
established to look at the future of the intelligence community.
There was, as I will discuss, a commission which Congress
established to look at the roles and missions of the armed forces
in light of the end of the Cold War. And all of these studies
done by the government, or by commissions set up by the
government, have reached the same conclusions, which is that the
structures that we have are just the right ones.
One can only view this as remarkable. Here we have a world
in which an intelligence community and a military establishment
created 50 years ago to fight the Cold War against the Soviet
Union turns out to be exactly the right set of structures and
exactly the right set of functions to deal with this new postCold War world. Suppose that one were to recognize that the world
really is different. Suppose that one did not believe that the
institutions that were created then are exactly the right ones.
What might such a person do to change the National Security Act?
What different set of structures might he or she create?
In order to stimulate thinking, I am going to speculate on
things that at the end of the day I might not come out completely
in favor of. What I want to do is to try to stretch all of our
minds by saying let's think as if we are, to paraphrase Dean
Acheson, present at the new creation. What kind of institutions
might we set up in a new National Security Act?
I want to take the reader through various portions of what
such an act might look like. I want to start with the question of
the conflict between national security and civil liberties.
During most of the Cold War, this subject was ignored in the
American government and in the university community. If it was
discussed at all, it was discussed as a problem that other
societies had. These individuals assumed that, in some societies,
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because they did not have a constitution, because they did not
have an independent judiciary, because they did not have a
commitment to civil liberties, there was a danger that civil
liberties might be limited by claims of national security by
secret intelligence agencies and so on. But that was not a
problem we had to worry about in the United States. Congress had
put a sentence in the National Security Act, in the portion
creating the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), saying it should
not function in the United States. That was going to be
sufficient. And that's what the government believed, that's what
the political science professors taught in their courses, and, I
think, that was what most Americans believed until we had the
scandals that accompanied Watergate. We learned that the CIA not
only tried to assassinate people abroad, but opened the mail in
New York City of American citizens and conducted mind experiments
on American citizens leading to suicides and other tragedies. We
learned that the CIA spied on Americans who were against the
Vietnam War. We learned that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) had a program for disrupting lawful political activities in
the United States by people that either J. Edgar Hoover or the
President of the day did not like. We were all quite startled by
this, and there was a great deal of moaning, groaning and
complaining, and almost nothing was done. There was almost no
legislation enacted in response to this. There were some rules
changed by the Attorneys General (mostly in secret) so we were
now told that if you saw the secret rule, it would be better than
the secret rule that you had not previously seen. But we were
still not told what, in fact, it was.
In 1990, I wrote an article with Jeanne Woods in which we
stated that we were really at a crossroads; that the end of the
Cold War provided an opportunity to finally do something about
the protection of civil liberties, because one could no longer
say that we had to tolerate limits on our civil liberties as
otherwise the Soviet Union would take over the world. But we also
warned in that article that there was a danger that things could
actually get worse rather than better. And, in fact, that is what
has happened. I will just give you one example. Since the Cold
War ended, the Congress of the United States enacted, and the
President signed, a bill which allows the FBI to break into your
home in the middle of the night (or as an FBI agent explained to
me once, "we actually do it during the day because people tend to
be home in the middle of the night"), steal your papers without
telling you that they have been there, and without having
probable cause to believe that you have committed a crime. The
Attorney General used to do this by his own initiative. Now he
goes to a judge and gets a warrant--but not a probable cause of
crime warrant--a special warrant from a special court which
allows agents of the government to break into your home without
knocking, without giving you warning that they are coming into
your house, taking your papers without telling you, and never
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notifying you that they have seized your papers. Congress enacted
a statute 2 years ago which authorizes the FBI to do this on the
grounds that there are threats to national security that justify
such action.
Now when you think about the history of the United States
and the degree to which searches, illegal searches, of the
colonists were a major cause of the American Revolution, you
realize what King George's mistake was. If he had only understood
this legislation, he would have simply said that the American
revolutionaries were agents of the French and then it would have
been all right to break into our homes without probable cause and
to steal our papers--because that is the theory of this
legislation. If you are believed to be an agent of a foreign
power, then the government has the right to do this. In a number
of other ways, things have gotten worse and not better since the
end of the Cold War. What we need to do, in fact, is, for the
first time, to systematically legislate with a recognition that
the United States is no different from any other country; that
power corrupts in every society; that secret agencies are more
dangerous to democracy than public agencies; and that, therefore,
they need to be under strict forms of control.
We need to legislate, first of all, standards of secrecy. It
remains the case in the United States that the authority to keep
information secret has been assumed by the President. And
Congress has constantly refused to legislate its own standards as
to what can and cannot be kept secret. So the standard that we
have now is an executive order, it can be changed any time by the
President. Indeed, the lawyers for the government will tell you
that the President can change it by secret executive order and
not tell you that he has done so. And the standard does not take
account of the public value of the information. That is, it
allows the government to keep secret information which may be
enormously important to public debate, simply because there is
some harm to national security. There is no requirement at all to
take account of whether this information is essential to public
debate or not. That kind of balancing will never occur unless
Congress enacts secrecy standards.
We also need legislation which tells the CIA and the FBI
precisely the circumstances under which they can conduct
surveillance of Americans, and which adopts a very simple
principle--if you are not breaking the law, the government has no
right to conduct surveillance of you. If you are breaking the
law, the government conducts surveillance of your unlawful
activities but that does not pertain to your political activities
and the political activities of all your friends. We also need
legislation that creates criminal penalties if government agents
violate the law. The Supreme Court has made it harder and harder
to bring a civil lawsuit for damages if your constitutional
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rights are violated by government officials, and we need
legislation to reestablish this right.
The last thing that we need in this area, and perhaps the
most important, is for Congress to create an institution in the
executive branch of the government which has the authority and
the mandate to worry about the protection of civil liberties visa-vis the national security agencies in the U.S. Government. The
fact is that there is no such entity in the American government.
And people, when they get into the U.S. Government in the
executive branch, no matter how well meaning they are, no matter
how many articles they have written about these subjects outside,
no matter how good their understanding of the Constitution is,
suddenly assume the mantle of the positions that they are in.
They start giving legal advice to the President based on the role
that they think they have been assigned by the structure of the
government in the place that they are in. There are no people in
the system who think it is their job to say to the President:
You can't break into peoples' homes and steal their
papers. That is a violation of the fundamental
principles of the Fourth Amendment of the American
Constitution. It doesn't matter whether you think the
Supreme Court might say that it is OK. You have an
obligation, as President of the United States, to
uphold the civil liberties of Americans and to make
your own judgments about what is required.
@noindentbody = There is no person in the executive branch
of the U.S. Government who says that to the President on any
issue, because there is no entity within the government that has
that responsibility. It is not clear where you would put this
agency, but I think that either in the White House or in the
Justice Department we need an office which has that
responsibility and that obligation.
Let me turn from civil liberties issues to the question of
the intelligence community. This is one of the areas in which
Congress has said we have to do some things differently--so they
created a commission. The President appointed Les Aspin, who had
just left the Defense Department as Secretary of Defense, to head
this commission. When he died, Harold Brown, who had been the
Secretary of Defense in the Carter administration, took over this
very distinguished commission. But all that this commission said
was that everything was fine. Well, I think it is clear that
everything is not fine, because the world has fundamentally
changed. I can illustrate it by an experience I had when I was in
the government the last time. There is a great deal of interest
by the American government in a small island off the coast of
Florida called Cuba. The Cubans had adopted a new economic
institution called a farmers' market--where supposedly people
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could bring things that they grew above a certain level to market
and sell them, with the government not setting the prices. There
was a great deal of interest within the government about whether
this was a genuine move toward a market economy or not. And so I
asked the CIA to convene a meeting of all the intelligence
analysts in the government to talk about these markets and what
it meant. And they got everybody together in a room, and the
discussion sounded like a discussion you might have if you got 12
medievalists together to talk about what markets looked like in a
medieval town. That is, nobody in the room had been to a Cuban
market, they all had read a few articles about it, and there were
a few pictures which had been taken and had been brought in to
show what a farmers' market looks like from a satellite--which
tells you not a great deal about how a farmers' market operates.
The conclusion of the meeting was that we didn't know.
Then I made what the participants thought was an interesting
suggestion: I said, you know there are people who do not happen
to be employees of the American intelligence community who are
also interested in this subject. Perhaps we could have another
meeting with some of them. Well, they thought that was an
interesting idea, and they found a building which they would
allow other people to go into. And we had a second meeting on
farmers' markets in Cuba. All of the first group came, and then
we had 12 other people. Six of them had been to farmers' markets
in Cuba. It was really quite extraordinary. They came early in
the morning and watched them through the day. They watched them
at the end of the day. And they could tell us a great deal. It
turns out that if you are there and look and listen and speak the
language, you do better than a satellite picture in finding out
what is in a farmers' market. Maybe not in counting missiles, but
in checking on farmers' markets. They recorded some interesting
things which none of us knew. It turned out the general consensus
of those people was that the markets were a sham. So this was not
a situation where you had a bunch of outsiders saying this is a
great change in Cuba, and the government people were saying the
opposite. They said these farmers' markets were, in fact, the
military selling food to gain a little money, and it was not
exactly an open market. But the point is that they knew about it
and it was an easy way to find out about it.
I am going to give you a second illustration, also from
Cuba, because I happened to work on that, and there are a lot of
good stories from there. At one point, people started leaving
Cuba in large numbers. You may remember 2-3 years ago in the
middle of the summer, they started coming out. There was a great
interest in the American government, to put it mildly, as to why
they were leaving. The governor of Florida had announced that he
did not care what the federal government was doing, he was going
to start arresting them if we did not stop them from coming. This
got everybody's attention. So the government announced that we
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were not going to let them into the United States anymore--we
were going to take them to Guantanamo. And yet they kept coming.
So we were picking them up and bringing them into Guantanamo, and
the question was--would more of them come out faster than we
could actually bring them to Guantanamo? There was enormous
interest in this. We kept asking the CIA about it. They did not
seem to have anything to say. One day there was a meeting of
high-level officials of the government, and somebody said it
looks like the Cubans were not coming out on rafts anymore
because they know they will be taken to Guantanamo. Another high
government official said, Yes it looks like they're finally
getting the word. And then we discovered that both of them were
basing this insight on the same source. The source was a frontpage story in The Washington Post.
It seems The Washington Post had sent a reporter to Cuba who
had gone down to the beach and interviewed people on the beach
and said, "Are you thinking of getting on rafts?" And the people
had said, "No, what's the point? We'll just get taken to the
other side of the island." The reporter had reported this very
valuable information.
It is clear that most of the information the President now
wants about the world is available if you go and look for it. It
is available from open sources, it is available from experts who
know the societies, it is available by going to the countries and
dealing with the people. And yet the U.S. Government relies
primarily for its source of information about what is going on in
the world on an agency which is dedicated to the notion that the
way to gather information is to gather it secretly, from an
unwitting source. It focuses on recruiting agents in foreign
governments and intercepting messages, flying satellites, and
having people sit in Langley, Virginia, analyzing all that
information and also looking at public sources.
This is not the kind of information that the President needs
and, therefore, I think what we need to do is to create a new
research organization--you could call it the Foreign Policy
Research Organization or the Central Research Organization, which
would be moved from Langley, Virginia, to downtown Washington. It
should be put into a building that one can get into without quite
as much difficulty as you have getting into the CIA. It should be
staffed by people who understand that, for most subjects which
the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of
Defense care about, information is to be gathered from public
sources with the addition of some small amounts of classified
information. It should be an agency which interacts actively with
the intelligence community, with the Non-Governmental
Organization (NGO) community, and which produces information for
the President from all of those sources. I think we continue to
need a clandestine agency that gathers secret information and
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occasionally conducts secret actions on behalf of the government,
but I think we need to do that in far fewer places and focused on
far fewer activities. There are not many countries in the world
where we still need spies for a long period of time as we did in
the Soviet Union. We ought not to conduct such activities in
democratic countries. We ought to conduct such activities only
when they are clearly consistent with the public foreign policies
of the United States. And we ought to avoid giving new tasks to
the intelligence community--whether it is interdicting drugs or
gathering economic intelligence. This is because the clandestine
intelligence community still has enormous secret powers, and
these secret powers are not used appropriately, in my view, to
deal with problems like drugs or economic intelligence
information.
Let me turn now to the military. Here, as I said, there was
a commission on roles and missions. It got much closer than other
commissions did to starting to talk about the real choices and
the real issues. Each of the military services saw this as both a
danger and an opportunity. But then, at the very last minute,
everybody pulled back, and there was a unanimous report saying
everything was fine. Let me suggest some things that we ought to
think about. First of all, I would argue that we ought to now
admit that one of the major things that was in the National
Security Act of 1947--the separation of combat air from the
ground forces--was a fundamental mistake. Combat air and ground
forces ought to be in the same military service as they were
throughout World War II. In other words, we should put the Air
Force--most of it, if not all of it--back into the Army and have
a single service which is geared to fighting what the Pentagon
now calls--in its wonderful ability to create acronyms--OOTWs,
which, for those of you who do not follow this, is "Operations
Other Than War." This includes peacekeeping, special operations,
and humanitarian missions. Those of you who follow the movement
of American military forces in and out of the United States and
around the world know that the military is asked to do a great
deal of this, but the military continues to resist the notion of
developing forces specifically for this purpose. We also need to
ask if carrier task forces are the best way to project power
abroad. Another issue is the status of the National Security
Advisor. That person does not have to go regularly to the Hill to
testify, but there are negative consequences arising from that.
The value of regular testimony is that it reminds those officials
that they need the support of Congress and that, in a
constitutional system, they need to be responsible to Congress.
The National Security Advisor doesn't believe that because he is
not confronted with the reality of it every day. So I think it is
time to raise the question of whether the National Security
Advisor should become a confirmed position.
Let me conclude by asking whether any of these changes would
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matter at all. I will do it by quoting two of our Presidents who
seem to go up in everybody's esteem more and more. One of them is
Harry Truman who, when the National Security Council was created
by the National Security Act, said, "the Congress can create the
National Security Council, but it can't make me go to their
meetings." And he refused to do so. The National Security Council
did not meet until the Korean War broke out. But I think the real
insight into this came from General Eisenhower, who was appalled
when Jack Kennedy came into office as President and abolished all
the structures for making national security policy, because JFK
had been trained by people to believe that structures got in the
way of creative policy. Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs what I
believe to be the correct way of thinking about this issue. He
said, in commenting on what Kennedy was doing, "Good organization
does not guarantee good policy. But bad organization guarantees
bad policy."
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CHAPTER 5
AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY
Robert F. Ellsworth
Our age is undergoing social, political and intellectual
changes of totally unprecedented speed and depth. No one can
predict the future, but we must try to be the ones who can see
"dimly but surely the hunt two fields ahead of the throng." Only
thus can we prepare now to advance and, if necessary, defend
American national security in the early 21st century.
Let me be clear: I do not intend to discuss today's
headlines. I will instead consider the larger flow of time and
events from now to about 2020 and how we might better identify
and take care of our national interests during that span of time.
The Twin Transformations: Geopolitics, and Military Technology.1
For about 10 years we have been living through a powerful,
interactive, double transformation. This transformation is
picking up momentum and will probably continue for another couple
of decades.
First is the worldwide geopolitical transformation in which
the context of American national security is constantly changing.
Instead of the Soviet threat, and the murderous ideologies and
devastating wars of the 19th and 20th centuries, the
international order in the early 21st century will be shaped by
new, powerful transnational forces. I mean the demographic
explosion in the poor regions and migration to the rich, and the
globalization of finance, pollution, production, trade, and
organized crime. All of these forces work upon and mutually
reinforce each other, and undermine the effectiveness of all
nation-states. At the same time the world is being swept by
powerful revivals of religions, and new assertions of ethnic
identities, paradoxically backed by certain nation-states. China
is emerging as the driving force of an ethnic "Asianism." At the
same time a fundamentalist and resurgent Islam is and will
continue to dominate the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.
National and ethnic pride, as well as religious zeal, can be
largely positive--as they were in the rise of Solidarity in
Poland in 1980--but religion and race can also bring fear and
loathing, not to mention hatred, to geopolitics, as they have in
the former Yugoslavia. Nelson Mandela speaks about some of
today's world leaders "following their blood rather than their
brains".2
Second is a technological transformation in which
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innovations in computer networks and biotechnology are creating
whole new industries--and new instruments to be used in military
operations, all around the world. Cheap missiles and complex
information control systems could by 2010 foreshadow the twilight
of the airpower century with enormous effects on our ability to
influence events. Missiles, chemicals, and biotechnology could
diminish the American role by severely limiting our access to
regions of vital national interest, or even ejecting us from
established positions. After 2020, directed energy weapons could
restore space and air operations3--but how such a hiatus would
have affected our national security in the interim would depend
on what we do.
The dynamics of the twin transformations, one in military
affairs and the other in geopolitics, could be as important over
the next 25 years as were the spiritual, geopolitical, and
military revolutions that enabled the West's rise to global
dominance some 500 years ago.4 The outcome could be destructive
and chaotic, bringing savage warfare over wide areas of the
globe--or the dawn of a new golden age of worldwide peace,
prosperity, and spiritual redemption. A third possibility is a
mixed outcome: scattered, short, severe conflicts, with peace and
prosperity also distributed selectively.
The double transformation fits what has quickly become the
preeminent paradigm for coming to terms with the realities of
post-Cold War global politics: Professor Samuel P. Huntington's
powerful thesis that the world is engaged in a giant clash of
civilizations, and that this clash is remaking the international
order.5 Huntington defines different civilizations--Western,
Orthodox, Islamic, African, Buddhist, Sinic, Japanese, Hindu,
Latin American--in terms of different religions, languages,
locations, or ideals. Not all these civilizations are clashing,
but the evidence confirms that the leading powers of some
civilizations--armed with increasingly effective technologies-are indeed clashing and will continue to do so well into the 21st
century.
National Interests, National Power.
In a world order being remade by the clash of civilizations,
what are the precise American national security interests that
can be advanced, or may be threatened, over the next two and a
half decades? And what should we do about it now?
We must recognize that America does indeed have national
interests in the world, including an extremely important interest
in the sturdy legitimacy of the international system as it
changes over time. We depend more and more on the international
system for our prosperity and our citizens' personal safety,

71

among other national interests. This does not imply that American
global hegemony is needed now or in the future--as it was needed
to deal with the global Soviet military threat throughout the
Cold War. Instead, we need to be both precise and clear about our
national interests as the twin military and geopolitical
transformations remake the international order.
Henry Kissinger has reminded us that:
Foreign policy must begin with some definition of what
constitutes a vital interest--a change in the
international environment so likely to undermine the
national security that it must be resisted no matter
what form the threat takes or how ostensibly legitimate
it appears.6
In terms of this dictum, the neo-nationalist, religious, and
ethnic impulses behind the clash of civilizations surely appear
in themselves ostensibly legitimate; but the political and
military behavior of some of their advocates threatens to
undermine our national security. U.S. national security in the
early 21st century is based, in my view, on five vital national
interests, which will continue to exist and can be advanced,
whether they are immediately threatened or not.

Vital Interests and What They Require. These vital interests
are to (1) prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the United States;
(2) prevent the emergence of a hostile hegemon in Europe or Asia;
(3) prevent the emergence of a hostile major power on U.S.
borders or in control of the seas or of space; (4) prevent the
catastrophic collapse of major global systems (trade, financial
markets, energy, and environmental); and (5) ensure the survival
of U.S. allies. Many other nations share these interests: in some
cases entirely, in most cases only partly.
The United States should continuously advance these
interests--and be prepared to fight for them if necessary,
preferably with allies whose interests are also at stake but by
ourselves if we have to.
A sixth vital interest is entirely up to the United States,
and it will be instrumental to securing the first five: to
promote unique U.S. leadership, military capabilities, and
reputation for adherence to clear U.S. commitments and evenhandedness in dealing with other states and people.

Important Interests and What They Require.
other national interests than these vital ones,
is important in discussing national security in
century to have a clear and discriminate public
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America has many
but I believe it
the early 21st
sense of which

specific national interests are vital and should therefore be the
touchstone of American national security policy. National
interests which are extremely important but not vital should also
be promoted, but threats to them would require the United States
to commit forces only with a coalition of allies whose vital
interests are themselves threatened. National interests which are
just important would require us to participate militarily but
only if the costs are low or others carry the lion's share of the
burden.7 Within that frame of reference we can prepare our
policies and our posture accordingly.

The Cascade of Changes in the World.
We have the moral and material strength to take care of our
vital interests and of our important ones, but it would be
immoral and dangerous for us to launch or sustain a crusade. I am
reminded of a conversation among Richard Nixon, General Vladimir
Kryuchkov (then head of the KGB), and myself in Moscow. It was
late March 1991, the spring before the December collapse of the
Soviet Union. We were in Kryuchkov's office on the fourth floor
of the Lyubyanka Building on Dzerzhinsky Square. Kryuchkov said:
The role of the United States in the world is more
important than ever, but there is a danger. The leading
role is a heavy burden; it can break even a strong
state. There was a time when we thought we could press
the imperialists and at the same time have our way with
China and in the Third World. We thought we held God by
the beard, but soon we realized the burden was beyond
our endurance. Beware.
At the time of the conversation with Kryuchkov in 1991, the
distribution of wealth and power and military competence in the
world was already changing radically and rapidly. Since then, it
has changed even more. Three events in the late 1970s and early
1980s had begun a cascade of changes that have now restructured
the international system as we have known it. Those events were:
the 1978 coming to power of Deng Xiaoping and his rapid decision
to open China to the world; the 1979 Islamic takeover of Iran;
and the 1985 coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow. At
about the same time, modern missiles, precision surveillance and
control, and stealth technologies began to come into wider use.
Since then, through the 1980s and 1990s the Chinese economy has
grown to awesome proportions and has become a huge consumer of
energy as well as a huge market for world trade and investment;
the Islamic resurgence has spread from Tehran in all directions
and today virtually controls the world's energy heartland; and
the Soviet Union has collapsed while Russia is still seeking its
domestic political footing and may emerge to become the new,
northern leg of the world's energy heartland by 2020.
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The Opening of China and its Consequences. Over the past few
years the United States has told North Korea how it should or
should not arm itself, told Japan how it should organize its
economy, told China how it should treat its own citizens, and
told both China and Singapore how they should treat American
citizens. In most of these cases, the United States either lost
the issue or was forced to back down very substantially. This
reflects the shifting balance of power between the United States
and Asia. This shift is partly due to China's successful
exploitation, beginning in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping, of President
Nixon's strategic opening to China in 1972.
When he died, Deng had directed that his ashes be, and they
were, scattered at sea rather than in China's great rivers, to
signify his openness to the world. As Roderick MacFarquhar points
out, Deng made China "accessible to foreign ideas and influences
in a manner unprecedented since the Tang dynasty in the seventh
century AD."8 China's economic role in the world has become
enormously important and is beginning to provide China with the
means to deal with their huge internal challenges and at the same
time to reach for real military power.
China is already the recipient of more foreign direct
investment than any other country in the world except the United
States. Their economy is as large as Japan's by some measures,
although with a population of 1.2 billion versus Japan's 125
million, China's per capita economy is much lower.
China's population is growing by another 125 million-another Japan--every 7-8 years, and every year 20 million
unemployed Chinese from the interior are "sweeping to the sea,"
as the Chinese in Beijing put it.
China's economy is forecast to continue to grow to within
shouting distance of the U.S. economy in a little over 10 years'
time,9 and will help the Chinese to deal with these challenges;
but the psychological effects on Americans, who have had the
world's largest economy since about 1912, will require
adjustments in our own self-perceptions. Politics in China for
the foreseeable future will be shaped by the tensions between the
effort to prop up the doomed Leninist state, and the imperative
to allow pluralism, decentralization, and economic growth to
continue on the course set by Deng.
China's military will play a critical role in the working
out of these internal tensions, as General Xiong Guangkai told me
when I visited him in Beijing recently. For both internal and
external purposes, their budget is growing rapidly, though from a
low base, and could in a few years' time be very substantial.
Chinese military authorities today write of "ways to defeat
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a powerful opponent with weak forces in a high-tech war," and of
how "technology increases the importance of preemptive strikes or
first strikes. . ."10 Even with the capabilities they may acquire
in the early 21st century, however, China's intentions are not
comparable and its capabilities will not be comparable to those
of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. The "local war" school of
thought is the dominant school in China: it cancels Mao's
requirement to prepare for a global war. As Michael Pillsbury
points out, "local" in Chinese means regional, partial,
sectional, or local, all at the same time.11 Because the Chinese
focus on rapid, decisive action for local advantage, their
approach can be quite destabilizing in a very large "local" area-East Asia--where both they and the United States have vital
national interests. The world got a taste of such strategy--and
its effects--in China's March 1996 Taiwan Strait Exercise, which
I will come back to later.
As Liu Huaqui, the Chinese Premier's and State Council's
foreign affairs adviser indicated to Pillsbury and me at a
private dinner in the Diaoyutai State Guest House in Beijing a
year ago, the Chinese leadership knows we have national interests
as well as influence, allies, and real power in Japan, Korea,
Taiwan, and the South China Sea. They know we have established
these interests by outpourings of American blood and treasure
over 4 decades, but I am not sure that the present Chinese
leadership accords much weight to those factors.
The South China Sea will be an increasingly important
national interest to China because it seems to them to be their
best local source of energy (other than coal). The Chinese
regime's very legitimacy depends on economic growth and that will
require--for industrial use alone--an increase from about 450
million tons of oil (TOE) equivalent in 1995 to as much as 950
TOE in 2005.12 We, too, have extremely important interests in the
South China Sea: mainly freedom of navigation for energy from the
Persian Gulf to East Asia (China will share that interest), and
access for our Seventh Fleet from its Pacific locations to the
Gulf. Beijing is also looking at East Siberia as a possible
source of natural gas.
Important and contentious as those matters are, in my view,
the Taiwan question will be the most difficult East Asia question
in the years to come. It may come to be the most vexing
political-military question in the world. Both sides see China as
"One China." But each side sees the terms and conditions very
differently. The question is linked in Beijing's analyses to our
strategic ally, Japan, which occupied Taiwan between 1895 and
1945. Japan also occupied and brutally exploited China in the
1930s and 1940s. The Chinese fear Japan as a possible "perfect"
military superpower in the early 21st Century. The Taiwan
question is also affected by Beijing's "pay-back" attitude
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against the West for what the Chinese feel as 150 years'
humiliation since the Opium Wars and the 1842 Treaty of Nanking.
More specifically, the post-Deng leadership is to some extent
hostage to the Taiwan question. Taiwan independence would wreck
the regime and bring either chaos or reinvigorated
authoritarianism. "Healing the wound" would reduce anxieties on
both sides of the Strait, and could possibly inspire
transformation of the regime in Beijing in a more open and
accountable direction.
China used its modest military capabilities in the March
1996 Taiwan Strait Exercise in a sophisticated and effective way
to cut down on the vote of the Taiwan independence party in
Taiwan's mid-March Presidential election. They fired M-9
ballistic missiles into the sea near Taiwan, exercised elements
of eight infantry divisions along the mainland coast, deployed
naval battle units in the western part of the Strait, flew mock
combat missions with IL-76 and SU-27 aircraft, and deployed SA10B SAMs.13
As everyone (including China's leadership) has noted,
however, the Taiwan Strait Exercise also shook up East Asia by
provoking the rapid deployment of the Nimitz and Independence
carrier battle groups to the area, reinforcing the U.S.-Japan
strategic alliance, and helping stimulate planning for the
largest joint U.S.-Australia-New Zealand exercise involving ANZUS
troops since World War II. It has energized the independence
movement on Taiwan, as I noticed when I attended the festive
inaugural of President Li Teng-hui in Taipei. This Spring a
Taiwan "National Development Conference" decided that "the two
sides are two equal political entities." The ruling Kuomintang
also spoke of two equal political entities.14 This is a new
formulation of the conventional "two systems" concept. None of
these reactions could have been welcome to Beijing's leaders.
As for America's role: Taiwan today is more democratic, more
capitalist, and more deeply embedded in the international system
than it was in 1972 at the time of the United States' acceptance
of the "One China" claims, spelled out in the Shanghai
Communique, or in 1979 when President Carter established formal
diplomatic ties with China and confirmed that acceptance, or in
1982 when President Reagan reconfirmed America's acceptance of
the claims of "One China." These triple acceptances do not commit
the United States to go to war to defend a renegade Taiwan, but
we are committed to prevent a violent takeover by China--as
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich made clear to Chinese leaders
recently. U.S. policy has remained ambiguous for 25 years, while
the twin transformations of geopolitics and technology have swept
both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The interactive dynamics of the
Taiwan question could, over the next 10 years or so, lead to
unwanted war--or to the peaceful entry of China into the
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international system on prudential terms. U.S. vital and
important interests can be advanced and defended by insuring the
latter.
Important as China is, it is far from being the only
challenge or opportunity in East Asia for American national
security in the early 21st century. Japan, Korea, the Asian part
of Russia, Southeast Asia--and China--look at each other as
strategic, economic, and political competitors. None considers
America to be its principal security threat. All depend on access
to the American market and American capital. Many feel dependent
on the United States for their security. So America is in a
unique position in Asia. We can afford to, and should, have
friendly relations with all Asian countries. At critical moments
we can throw our weight in the direction which is seen to be the
pacesetter in the worldwide revolution in military affairs.

The Islamic Takeover of Iran and its Consequences. Without
pausing to analyze all the causes of the fundamentalist Islamic
resurgence that has been gathering momentum since the 1979
Khomeini revolution in Iran, it is necessary to understand that
it has affected every Islamic country, that it is to some extent
a reaction against the modernizing power of the West, and that in
the process Islam has become heavily politicized. Islamic
fundamentalism has come to signify, in different ways in
different places, extremism and expansion.
I respect Islam as a religion: its rigorous and disciplined
scripturalism sets an admirable standard, and its higher theology
and redemptive spiritual strengths are beyond question. But as
the great cultural anthropologist Ernest Gellner has pointed out,
Islam has evolved into a rigid and anti-rational theocracy.15
Ambitious clergymen, ecstatic theologians, and political
ideologues have come to dominate the masses--and many of the
higher clergy have been co-opted. As Huntington has written,
political Islam is also fueled by demographics: "For years to
come, Muslim populations will be disproportionately young . . .
teenagers and people in their twenties."16 The resulting
turbulence will continue to disrupt both Islamic societies and
their neighbors well into the 21st century. This is nothing new:
"The off-and-on-again conflict between Islam and the West has
existed for centuries . . ."17
Fundamentalists--who now control Iran, pursue campaigns of
violence in Egypt, are influential in Libya, and may soon control
Algeria--also enjoy the support of several governments and the
deference of many (including that of Saudi Arabia). They may
continue to threaten our vital national interests for several
more decades: specifically, (a) our interest that there be no
curtailment in energy supplies to the world (U.S. imports from
the Persian Gulf are now at least 10 percent of our total
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consumption and growing, and East Asia heavily depends on imports
from the Gulf), and (b) our interest in the national security of
our European and Middle Eastern allies.
Powers in the region have noted the shortcomings of Iraq's
military efforts in DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and are responding by
acquiring ballistic and cruise missiles--and high-performance,
anti-air and air-to-air missiles with associated C4ISR (command,
control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance) systems. In the foreseeable future, they could be
able to deny access to us, and directly threaten our allies. They
will also be increasingly able to threaten us in our established
positions, as they did in the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi
Arabia in the summer of 1996.
Both Iran and Libya (which may already have, or have access
to, nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons) are reported to be
eager to buy the Nodong and the Taepo Dong-2 ballistic missiles
from North Korea when (and if) they are available. The Nodong
would put Israel in range from Iran and parts of Southern Europe
from Libya. From Libya, the Taepo Dong-2 could reach London,
Berlin and Moscow.18 The threat of such ballistic missiles, and
stealthy cruise missiles--or large fleets of upgraded SCUDs which
in small numbers and primitive models were so troublesome in
DESERT STORM--are already beginning to affect perceptions of the
balance of power in the Middle East.
These threats engage the nuclear issue, East Asia, the oil
issue and our alliances--and therefore vital American national
interests--well into the 21st century. The challenge for U.S.
national security policy is to resist this dangerous trend early
enough and in a form that is effective enough to push the
ultimate threats further and further into the future. This should
include a well-coordinated international buildup of oil
stockpiles as buffers against supply discontinuities. The
specific challenge for U.S. and allied military planners is to
develop more effective counters to the rising missile threat than
seem to be possible from the active defenses that have received
so much U.S. money and attention in the past. In March 1997, the
U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe, General Joulwan, testified that
defenses against ballistic and cruise missiles are "inadequate to
meet the challenges of the future."19 An effective system will
necessarily include air-borne (and ultimately space-based) laser
systems, new forms and structures of deterrence, and
multidimensional preemption systems.

The Collapse of the Soviet Union and its Consequences.
Although we have a tendency to hold a mental image of Russia as
the successor to the Soviet Union in geopolitics, that is
misleading. The government of Russia enjoys only limited
political legitimacy at home and, despite the rhetoric of its
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brilliant foreign minister, Yevgeny Primakov, lacks the ability
to project political, economic, or military power beyond its
"near abroad." Even in its "near abroad," Moscow's writ is weak.
The countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
actually value their relations with the United States so highly
that Moscow finds it helpful when dealing with them to display
its own good relations with Washington. The proliferation of
Russian weapons and skills to criminals, insurgents and
terrorists, and rapid further military fragmentation, pose a far
more immediate international danger than notional Russian
military aggression anywhere.
At the same time, Russian companies are becoming
increasingly active participants in the global economy. This is
particularly evident in the energy and mining sectors, but rising
Russian steel and arms exports, the purchase of a number of
Western brokerage houses, the joint venture of Khrunichev and RSC
Energia with Lockheed Martin to provide space launches with
Russia's Proton rockets, and the listing of Russian
telecommunications and oil and gas company stocks on the New York
Stock Exchange are also indicative. Promstroybank, one of
Russia's largest, has opened an office on Park Avenue in New
York. Far from confining their activities to the private sector,
moreover, the so-called "new Russians" are becoming increasingly
influential in government policy, including not only economic but
also security and foreign policy.20
Looking a quarter century ahead ("two fields ahead of the
throng"), it is in our interest to help restore control of
nuclear weapons and weapons material21 and enforce the NonProliferation Treaty--and to work toward a cooperative future
Russian role in dealing with the shift of the world balance
toward Asia, and the persistence of militant and military Islam.
As World War II drew to a close, the U.S. Air Force planned
against the post-war resurgence of the former enemies (Germany
and Japan).22 In the 1990s we have shown a tendency to follow an
analogous approach to Russia, at least for the time being. This
is a mistake. Russia's military, along with their defense
industry, have been in an inexorable, destructive, demoralizing
decline since the end of 1991. Leading Russian politicians count
survival as Russia's most pressing national interest, and this
will clearly be served by keeping an open U.S. option. Yet the
way of thinking of many in the U.S. foreign policy elite is still
tinged with nostalgia for the good old Soviet threat.
In the early 21st century, a stabilized and economically
robust Russia could be an extremely important ally in the new
regional order: first (but not only) to the south of Russia,
where the oil reserves of the Caspian Basin may rival those of
the Persian Gulf, and where the turbulent and militarized borders
of Islam encroach. Russia's own proven energy reserves are even
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bigger than those of the Caspian. Place names in the region, like
Novorissiisk, Krasnoyarsk, Tengiz, Baku, and Kovitkinskoye, will
rapidly become familiar to Americans concerned with our national
security in the early 21st century.
For these purposes, I support a NATO/Russia Charter that
would give Russia a real voice in the security issues that NATO
will be acting on over the next quarter century. These
arrangements will be essential, in my judgement, to the
legitimacy of a European security system in the early 21st
century. They would lay the foundation for ensuring Russian help
for three of our own (and many others') national interests: a
strong and truly global energy system, in which Russia itself,
and the Caspian Sea region, would be copious sources of oil and
gas; containment of Islamic militarism; and no hostile hegemon in
Europe.
The Challenge for American National Security.
America's national security in the early 21st century can be
protected only if our Presidents and congresses are able to
define, decide, and persuade the American public--and the leading
powers of the world's other civilizations--of our vital national
interests, and our determination to advance and defend them. This
will not be an overnight effort, and it will take more than
words--important as words are. What it will take is American
mastery (preferably with allies) of the twin transformations: the
geopolitical and the military-technological, and their powerful
interaction.

Requirement for U.S. Military to Dominate. Part of the
American persuasiveness will be the maintenance of a superior,
coercive American military force--and its continuous renewal well
into the 21st century--to dominate the emerging worldwide
revolution in military affairs. This does not mean keeping the
same or a larger number of divisions, air wings, and fleets as
today. It does not mean adding more new versions of the same
weapons.
It does not necessarily mean adding dollars to the Defense
budget. U.S. military planners and industry must now move past
the status quo or possibly fall behind lesser rivals who face
fewer obstacles. In the early 21st century, the U.S. military
could become the victims of the revolution in military affairs,
rather than its pacesetters, no matter what our budget is. These
tendencies could lead by 2015 or so to great difficulty for our
forces in the face of rogue states or major powers who could deny
access to, or even evict us from, areas of vital national
interest like the Persian Gulf or East Asia or the high seas--or
threaten the existence of our allies.
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The Challenges and the Obstacles.
With the rise to prominence, in the hands of several powers,
of weaponized unmanned aerial vehicles, affordable highresolution spy satellites, massive numbers of stealthy cruise and
ballistic missiles, distributed high-performance anti-air missile
systems and (in the hands of states and sub-state actors)
information warfare technologies and organizations, the coming
military revolution could transform war in the early 21st
century. Already, according to one survey, 35 non-NATO countries
have ballistic missiles--of which 18 are capable of carrying
nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads. Sixty-seven non-NATO
countries possess cruise missiles.23 China's General Ding Henggao
told me in Beijing last year that precision guided missiles are
the most important single system in China's future defense
posture. My own research leads me to estimate that China holds
between 300 and 950 nuclear warheads in inventory.
Among the obstacles confronting American military planners
today are a system in which Congress continues to spend too much
money on old weapons and industry lobbies Congress to do so, and
a lack of realism about the scale and speed of change in the way
geopolitics actually works. Internal obstacles include our own
military's tendency to disregard the ability of our rivals to
respond to, or leapfrog, our own plans. We say we won our last
war, so we don't need to change much. This overlooks the fact
that our last enemy lost his war in full view of the rest of the
world--and today many others in the world are undertaking heroic
efforts to overcome American concepts and weapons.
Our main rivals' military revolutions are paced by their
cash flow (and even accelerated by commercial imports of
technology from the United States and Western Europe). We are
paced by our development lead times and the Federal Acquisition
Regulations. The contrast between government procurement and
America's private sector has been particularly dramatic:
inventiveness and flexibility have been our civilian hallmarks,
capitalizing on new technology in every field. I believe new ways
to spin-in from the commercial economy with its lower costs and
excellence of performance could help our military to get ahead
and stay ahead. The U.S. Air Force is already moving strongly
toward commercial services, products and technologies to
modernize most unclassified space systems.

The U.S. Defense Budget Structure and Size. These days the
Congress is considering President Clinton's proposed defense
budget for fiscal year 1998, and beginning to discuss the
administration's statutory Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General John Shalikashvili's "Joint
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Vision 2010"--an important reference for the QDR and for the
proposed budget--said last year that the "U.S. must prepare to
face a wider range of threats, emerging unpredictability,
employing varying combi- nations of technology, and challenging
us at varying levels of intensity." As the defense budget
continues to drift downward, however, funding to deal with
"emerging unpredictability" is falling like a rock.
The Clinton administration and the Congress are set to let
overall defense funding decline slightly over the next 5 years.
Given the powerful national political momentum to reduce the
federal deficit while protecting entitlements and cutting taxes,24
this is about the best that can be expected. The Republicans'
1996 Congressional Budget Resolution actually projected deeper (5
percent) cuts in the Defense budget by 2002 than does the Clinton
administration.
The problem is the structure of the Defense budget: the
administration and Congress plan to increase major weapon system
purchases by almost 40 percent by 2002 while funding for Research
and Development (R&D) is projected to decline by over 15 percent
during the same period. The military's Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstrations were slashed by Congress by 40 percent
last year. Funding has dropped by about 20 percent over the past
3 years for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), where many of the most innovative programs with the
potential for yielding revolutionary improvements in information
technology and access to theaters of vital interest are located.
The administration now proposes a slight increase (about 2
percent) for DARPA over the next 2 years.
Secretary of Defense Cohen's task is a formidable one. It is
to lead an American revolution in military affairs and to
restructure the Defense budget to insure American dominance of
information systems, awareness technologies, and directed energy
weapons by 2010. Otherwise, our opponents may be able to keep us
out of regions of vital national interest, checkmating anything
else we might do with the rest of our military establishment.
Conclusion:

The Need for American Leadership.

Any understanding of American national security in the early
21st century must begin with the way the White House, and the
Republican Congress that swept into power in 1994, have ignored
the far-reaching double trans- formation: first, in the
international order, especially in the Islamic heartland and in
East Asia--and second, the worldwide revolution in military
affairs. They have also ignored the unique leadership capacity of
the United States among the major power centers of the world.
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There is a perception both at home and abroad that the
United States, which remains the greatest power of them all, has
been turning inward--walking away from the top of the stack. At
home there is uneasiness about risks to vital national interests,
and a sense of losing out on the rewards of global leadership.
Overseas, China and other major powers are concluding--I hope
they are wrong--that reliable American leadership may be a thing
of the past. These perceptions can lead to future coalitions
against the United States. If we are not going to lead, others
may try to do so themselves. For example, the Premier of China
and the President of Russia in Beijing last year proposed a
China-Russia "strategic partnership for the 21st century."25
Theoretically such a "partnership" (which remains largely
inchoate) could come to include Iran, with which both China and
Russia have strong financial and weapons links, and possibly
Iraq.
It is true that the domestic political base for a national
security policy that would take good care of vital and important
interests in the early 21st century is uncertain. The foundations
for domestic political confidence are weak. There is widespread
skepticism toward a government and a political system that
sometimes seem tawdry, slow, indifferent, and incapable of
getting things right. In this domestic climate, there are those
who say it is not possible to have a coherent national security
policy.
Still, the United States does have vital and important
national interests in the world, and the Presidents and
congresses over the next quarter century are still the only
citizens who can define, lead, and persuade the country of those
national interests which affect everyone, for good or ill.
Moreover we--and we alone--will continue to have the intellectual
and military power, and the skill, and the global prestige to
lead.
For the next 4 years, the President and the Vice President,
despite their fevered distractions, must try to prepare the
country for the early 21st century by giving sustained attention
to our vital and important national interests, rather than our
sentimental or moralistic impulses. We must focus on Russia,
China, Japan, and Western Europe--not to pressure them to follow
domestic and foreign policies that we would dictate, but to
increase their interest in cooperating with their neighbors, and
with the United States. In this we must enlist the active
cooperation of the Europeans--who rub shoulders with Russia, are
closer than we are to turbulent Islam, and do more trade with
East Asia than they do across the Atlantic.
The opportunities are wide open for U.S. leadership here at
home; and they are wide open substantively all around the world.
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I hope President Clinton and Vice President Gore will exploit
these opportunities to their political advantage. I hope the
Republicans in Congress will compete with them on this basis, to
their political advantage. It would be good for the country, and
good for the world.
All this will require more than analyses like the one I have
offered here today. The great flowing river of our unique
national history has sometimes rushed through shallow and
turbulent white water rapids, sometimes eddied in foul and
dreadful stagnant pools, once fought "a great civil war, testing
whether [this] nation or any nation so conceived and so
dedicated, can long endure."26 Sometimes this nation has, by its
very example, overflowed its banks in floodwaters of great
benefit to the whole world. Through all our history has coursed a
deep and powerful current fed by everlasting springs of purpose,
endurance, and courage--often in the face of great adversity and
animosity.
Many articulate and passionate Americans today, however,
believe the United States is morally unfit to lead. Many others
believe the opposite: the outside world is so corrupt that it is
not worthy of American efforts. For these reasons purposeful and
confident American leadership will not be sustainable in the
early 21st century unless it is actively and consistently
supported by young men and women like you in this room, who
understand America, and understand the world. For you and for the
United States, the early 21st century holds great dangers and
exciting opportunities. The helm is in your hands, the compass is
in your heads, and the driving power is in your love of this
great nation.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5
1. I am indebted to Francois Heisbourg, the brilliant
European strategic analyst, for drawing my attention to what he
calls the simultaneous transformations. His fuller explanation
will appear in a forthcoming publication.
2. Reported by Anthony Lewis in The New York Times Magazine,
March 23, 1997, p. 43.
3. These projections are suggested by a number of engineers.
See, for example, T.K. Jones in Electronics Industries
Association Ten-Year Forecast, Washington: 32nd Annual Ten-Year
Forecast Conference, October 17-18, 1996, pp. 155-159.
4. An expanded analysis of the contemporary revolution in
military affairs is set out in Michael G. Vickers, Warfare in
2020: A Primer, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
Washington: 1996.

84

5. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
Huntington's thesis is also controversial because it cuts across
the grain of the American ideology of Progress. Rather than
drawing on ideology, Huntington uses rigorous observation and
strict empiricism.
6. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York: Simon & Schuster,
1994, p. 812.
7. For a fuller discussion of "national interests," see "A
Report from the Commission on America's National Interests":
Robert Ellsworth, Andrew Goodpaster, Rita Hauser, Co-Chairs,
1996. Co-Executive Directors were Graham Allison, Dimitri Simes,
and James Thomson. This report includes definitions of the 6
vital national interests I have listed above, plus 12 "extremely
important" national interests such as preventing and ending major
conflicts in important geographic regions, and preventing massive
uncontrolled immigration across U.S. borders; 11 "just important"
ones such as discouraging massive human rights violations in
foreign countries as a matter of official government policy; and
5 "less important" or secondary ones such as balancing bilateral
trade deficits and enlarging democracy elsewhere for its own
sake.
8. "Demolition Man," The New York Review of Books, March 27,
1997, p. 16.
9. My understanding of China's economy is drawn from Charles
Wolf, Jr., of RAND's presentation, "Security Implications of
Long-Term Economic and Military Trends in Asia," to the China
Institute of Contemporary International Relations, in Beijing,
June 17-18, 1996. Wolf is careful and professional, and he
acknowledges that all analyses of the Chinese economy including
his own are uncertain and controversial.
10. Dr. Michael Pillsbury has gathered and translated a
large body of hard-to-get Chinese military leaders' writings, and
has now made them available in Chinese Views of Future Warfare,
ed. Michael Pillsbury, Washington: National Defense University,
Institute of National Strategic Studies, 1997.
11. Ibid., in the Preface.
12. Energy Demands in Five Major Asian Developing Countries,
Ishiguro and Akiyama: Washington: The World Bank, 1995, pp. 146147.
13. From an analysis prepared by the Office of Naval
Intelligence and published in May 1996.

85

14. Taiwan, "Mainland Affairs Council News Briefing," March
10, 1997, No. 0016.
15. Ernest Gellner, Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of
Human History, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988, p.
113.
16. Huntington, p. 117.
17. Samuel P. Huntington, "Hassner's Bad Bad Review," The
National Interest, No. 47, Spring 1997, p. 99.
18. The Economist, January 4, 1997, p. 33.
19. Aerospace Daily, March 19, 1997, pp. 409-410.
20. Based upon an analysis by Dr. Jeremy Azreal, RAND, and
sent to me in a private communication.
21. The nuclear materials stockpiles in Russia are of
particular concern because weapons material accounting is in a
very poor state. See Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, Plutonium
and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities
and Policies, SIPRI, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
22. Perry M. Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace, 19431945, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970, pp.
51-53.
23. The Economist, January 4, 1997, p. 33.
24. President Clinton and Congressional leaders are
promising to balance the budget and cut taxes, but some 77
percent of Americans oppose any reduction in future spending on
Social Security and Medicare, according to a nationwide poll
conducted March 13-23 by The Washington Post, Harvard University
and the Kaiser Family Foundation, The Washington Post, March 29,
1997, p. A4.
25. XINHUA in English, April 25, 1996.
26. Lincoln demonstrated courage, hope, and great faith in
delivering the Gettysburg Address on November 19, 1863--almost a
year before the decisive actions at Mobile Bay and Atlanta, and
Lincoln's own reelection.

86

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
AMBASSADOR ROBERT ELLSWORTH is the President, Robert Ellsworth
Company, Inc. A former congressman from the state of Kansas,
Ambassador Ellsworth has served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO (196971), Assistant Secretary of Defense (1974-75) and Deputy
Secretary of Defense (1975-77). He has also served as Director of
the Atlantic Council of the United States and the American
Council on Germany. Between 1990 and 1996, he was Chairman of the
Council of The International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Ambassador Ellsworth was a key advisor on foreign affairs to
Senator Robert Dole during the 1996 Presidential campaign.
DR. MORTON H. HALPERIN is a Senior Fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations. Dr. Halperin has held senior positions in both
the Department of Defense (1966 to 1969) and the National
Security Council (1969) and served as Director of the Washington
Office of the American Civil Liberties Union (1984 to 1992).
Between 1994 and 1996 Dr. Halperin served as Special Assistant to
the President and Senior Director for Democracy at the National
Security Council. Much of Dr. Halperin's writing has focused on
the tension between the demands of national security and civil
liberties.
DR. DAVID JABLONSKY is the Professor of National Security
Affairs, Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army
War College. A graduate of Dartmouth College, Kansas University
and Boston University, Dr. Jablonsky is the author of four books
dealing with European history and international relations. He is
a retired infantry colonel who has held the Elihu Root Chair of
Strategy and the George C. Marshall Chair of Military Studies at
the U.S. Army War College.
DR. LAWRENCE KORB is Director of the Center for Public Policy
Education, The Bookings Institution. Dr. Korb is the author of 15
books and over 100 articles on national security issues. He
served as Assistant Secretary of Defense from 1981 through 1985
and was awarded the DoD Distinguished Public Service Medal for
his contributions in this position. Thereafter, Dr. Korb focused
his research on issues relating to the defense budget,
interservice cooperation and defense procurement. Since the end
of the Cold War, Dr. Korb has been a key figure in the debate
about the future of the civilian defense industrial base.
PROFESSOR RONALD STEEL teaches at both George Washington
University and the University of Southern California. A graduate
of both Harvard University and the Sorbonne, Professor Steel is
the author of five major books and numerous essays and articles
on issues relating to American politics and foreign affairs. He
is a Pulitzer Prize finalist whose writings have won such
prestigious awards as the National Book Critics' Circle Award,

87

the Bancroft Prize in American History and the American Book
Award. His 1995 book, entitled Temptations of a Superpower, is a
provocative analysis of the prospects for U.S. foreign policy in
a post-Cold War context. Professor Steel has been a contributing
editor for The New Republic since 1980.

88

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.
Commandant
*****
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Director
Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon
Director of Research
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.
Authors
Ambassador Robert Ellsworth
Dr. Morton H. Halperin
Dr. David Jablonsky
Dr. Lawrence Korb
Professor Ronald Steel
Director of Publications and Production
Ms. Marianne P. Cowling
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
Secretaries
Mrs. Victoria Kuhn
Mrs. Rosemary Moore
*****
Composition
Mrs. Mary Jane Semple
Cover Artist
Mr. James E. Kistler

89

